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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
The launch of the Expanded Public Works Programme has 
led to preferential use of labour-intensive 
construction methods over conventional methods in 
construction and maintenance of public infrastructure 
assets.  This report evaluated five bulk water 
infrastructure projects in Madibeng Municipality where 
labour-intensive construction methods were used.   
    
 
The research found that factors which adversely 
affected construction progress included: inability to 
transfer experience and lessons learnt from one project 
to the next, skills and experience shortcomings, 
administrative and management realities, negative 
interventions from stakeholders and failure of the 
Municipality to set specific objectives and monitor 
project achievements with respect to intended 
objectives.  Appropriate training and support from 
local communities were found to enhance success during 
construction.    
 
 
It was concluded that labour-intensive construction 
methods are feasible for bulk water provision projects 
and can generate productive significant employment 
provided certain basic requirements were in place.  
Ultimately the findings led to the compilation of 
lessons learnt from the projects.    
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Like most developing countries, South Africa has a 
pressing need to provide infrastructure and housing as 
well as generate employment; both in context of low 
levels of individual skills and institutional capacity.  
Since 1994, the South African government has embarked 
on programmes aimed at addressing these problems, the 
most recent being the Expanded Public Works Programme 
which was launched in 2004.   
 
 
This investigation project will evaluate five potable 
water reticulation infrastructure projects conducted 
labour-intensively in Madibeng Municipality in the 
North West Province, South Africa.    
         
 
1.1  Background 
 
South Africa is one of the world’s leaders in the 
production and export of precious metals and minerals 
such as gold, coal, diamonds and platinum.  However, 
despite its natural wealth, a large percentage of the 
population is unemployed and most people live below the 
poverty line and are without basic services.  Moreover, 
data from Statistics South Africa and the Labour Force 
Survey indicates that unemployment rates have grown 
significantly in the country over the past decade.        
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Unemployment is not a recent problem nor is it unique 
to South Africa.  Many reasons1 have been offered to 
explain the country’s high unemployment rate, some of 
which include: the consequences of previous political 
and economic policies and laws, the country’s debt 
servicing, population growth, lack of attention to 
human capital development and prolonged deterioration 
in the real growth rate and rising capital intensity of 
production.   
 
 
South Africa is characterised as a middle income 
developing country and has one of the highest 
unemployment rates in the world as illustrated in  
Table 1.1. 
 
Table 1.1:  Unemployment rates by region 
 
Region 
 
Total unemployment (%) 
World 6.3 
Industrialised economies 6.8 
Transition economies 9.4 
South Asia 4.8 
Latin America and Caribbean 9.0 
Middle East and North Africa 11.9 
Sub Sahara Africa 10.8 
South Africa 26.5* 
(Source: Extracts from ILO, 2004 and * Labour force survey, 2005) 
 
 
                                                 
1 Reasons for poverty and unemployment in South Africa were taken 
from a report “Creating Jobs, Fighting poverty: An Employment 
Strategy Framework” Author is unknown, report from government 
website: www.polity.org.za/html/govdocs/misc/jobsframework1.html 
sighted in October 2004. 
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More than one decade after the first democratic 
election in the country, the central economic problem 
confronting the South African government is an 
unemployment rate of crisis proportions and the 
concomitant deepening of poverty and inequality (Mayer 
and Altman, 2005).  The poverty and unemployment 
problem did not begin post 1994, but an analysis of 
South Africa’s first nationally representative 
household income and living standard survey indicated 
that half of all black South Africans lived in poverty 
in 1993 (Michael and Julian, 2001).   
 
 
One of the means of mitigating unemployment problems in 
developing countries has been the use of labour-
intensive construction methods.  Programmes implemented 
in other countries like Kenya, Honduras and India have 
resulted in the construction of good quality 
infrastructure to serve the basic needs, while creating 
significant jobs for communities in need (McCutcheon, 
1995; McCutcheon 2003:15-56; McCutcheon and Taylor 
Parkins, 2003).   
 
 
In the past South Africa has also undertaken large 
scale labour-intensive programmes such as the National 
Public Works Programme, however, the programme did not 
meet most of its principal objectives (McCutcheon, 
2001).  After previous unsuccessful attempts at other 
similar programmes, the South African government 
recently launched the Expanded Public Works Programme 
in 2004 which aims to create 1 million work 
opportunities in a five year time frame in order to 
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alleviate the increasing unemployment problem 
(Phillips, 2004).  
 
 
Assuming that the programme will take three years for 
the programme to reach full-scale implementation, the 
funding of the Expanded Public Works Programme will 
result in approximately one million work opportunities 
of varying duration, or approximately 500 000 person-
years of employment.  The programme aims to create 
employment opportunities for at least 40% women, 30% 
youth and 2% disabled.   
 
 
1.2  Current situation in South Africa 
 
According to Lighelm et al (1990) and Reiley (1992), 
the level of unemployment in South Africa increased 
from 7% in 1980 to 18% in 1991.  Since then, the 
unemployment rates have increased drastically reaching 
levels of 30.5% in 2002 (Labour Force Survey, 2005).  
Unemployment trends from 1995 to 2005 are presented in 
Table 1.2. below.  
 
 
In South Africa, two different concepts of unemployment 
are used routinely, i.e. the strict (narrow) definition 
and the expanded (broad) definitions.  The narrow 
definition applies to a job-search test while the broad 
definition accepts as unemployed those who did not 
search for work in a 4-week reference period, but who 
report being available for work and say they would 
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accept if a suitable job were offered. In 1998, the 
narrow concept was declared the ‘official’ definition 
of unemployment.   
 
 
Table 1.2:  Unemployment trends in South Africa (1995-2005)   
Year Strict  
definition* (%) 
Broad 
definition** (%) 
1995 16.9 26.5 
1996 19.3 34.9 
1997 21.0 38.9 
1998 25.2 37.5 
1999 23.3 36.2 
2000 25.8 35.9 
2001 29.5 41.5 
2002 30.5 41.8 
2003 28.0* 41.8* 
2004 26.2* 41.0* 
2005 26.5** 40.5** 
(Source: extracts from South Africa’s economic development 
trajectory (Mayer and Altman, 2004) - * September data from Labour 
Force Survey, 2005 and ** March 2005 data from Labour Force Survey 
2005) 
  
 
Columns 2 and 3 in Table 1.2 present the strict and 
broad definitions, respectively.  According to column 
2, unemployment rates had decreased temporarily by 2.1% 
in 1999 and then continued on the rising trend until 
2003 during which they dropped by 2.5%.  A further 
decline of 1.8% was recorded in 2004 and subsequently 
unemployment increased by 0.3% to 26.5% in 2005.   
 
 
According to the Labour Force Survey (2005), South 
Africa had an official (narrow definition) total 
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unemployment rate of 26.5% and an expanded (broad) 
definition of 40.5% in 2005. 
 
 
Literature suggests that the high unemployment rate is 
exacerbated by the low levels of skills in the country 
(McCord, 2004).  According to McCord (2004), skills 
development is important for alleviating unemployment 
as general observations indicate that unemployment 
rates are the lowest among educated persons in South 
Africa.  
 
 
Unemployment has also been linked to the prevalent and 
increasing crime rates in South Africa.  According to 
the South African Police Services (SAPS) Crime 
Statistics (2004), there is empirical evidence that 
crime increased at the same time as unemployment rose.  
The report suggested that the rise in unemployment may 
be forcing more people into illegal ways of gaining 
income for survival.   
 
 
One of the traditional ways for one to begin to earn 
money and enter into the formal economy has been via 
the construction industry (McCutcheon, 2003).  The 
industry constitutes a substantial percentage of the 
country’s expenditure and with current backlogs in 
infrastructure provision for poor communities, there is 
a large scope for this industry to contribute to 
employment creation initiatives.  In an attempt to 
alleviate unemployment and poverty, the Department of 
Public Works has embarked on a number of labour-
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intensive programmes, the most recent being the 
Expanded Public Works Programme.   
 
 
Phillips et al (2005a) observed that unemployment is so 
acute in South Africa that no single intervention will 
solve it.  In addition, in order for government to 
reach its aim of halving unemployment by 2014, some  
546 000 full-time jobs will have to be created 
annually.  Although labour-intensive construction 
projects generally result in the generation of short 
term employment2, it is thought that the correct 
implementation of initiatives such as the Expanded 
Public Works Programme could contribute meaningfully 
towards the targeted jobs which need to be generated.   
 
 
1.3  Defining labour-intensive construction    
 
In the construction industry construction methods can 
be classified as equipment intensive or labour-
intensive, depending on the content of labour and 
equipment.  Equipment intensive construction is the 
conventional construction method which refers to the 
combination of labour and equipment in such a way that 
most of the work is conducted by equipment and only 
supported by a small labour force (McCutcheon, 1995).   
 
 
                                                 
2 Jobs generated by construction projects generally last as long as 
the construction period which is generally limited.  The types of 
jobs to be generated by initiatives such as the Expanded Public 
Works Programme are expected to last for between four to six 
months. 
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According to McCutcheon (2006a), labour-intensive may 
be defined as the economically efficient employment of 
as great a proportion of labour as is technically 
feasible, ideally throughout the construction process 
including production of materials, to  produce as high 
a standard of construction demanded by the 
specification and allowed by the funding available; 
labour-intensive construction results in the generation 
of a significant increase in employment opportunities 
per unit of expenditure by comparison with conventional 
capital intensive methods.  According to the definition 
emphasis is not only on the use of more labour than 
conventional methods, but also places importance on 
other important elements of a project such as quality 
and cost.   
 
 
It is also important to accentuate the difference 
between optimal and maximum use of labour.  According 
to Tajgman and de Veen (1998), the latter may occur in 
projects where income generation and job creation are 
the principal objectives, and would include disaster 
relief or food for work projects which are temporary 
and where quality and productivity are usually low.  
Relief programmes are conducted to react to natural or 
man made catastrophes such as droughts, floods and wars 
and their prime objective is to provide food and income 
to affected individuals while providing infrastructure.  
On the other hand, optimal use involves an appropriate 
mix of labour and equipment required to provide 
products of adequate quality in a cost effective manner 
(Tajgman and de Veen, 1998).   
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It is imperative to distinguish between relief 
programmes and labour-intensive construction methods.  
Although they have very different aims and objectives, 
the two are often confused.  Due to the undesirable 
outcomes of relief programmes, labour-intensive 
programmes could be perceived negatively which often 
leads to resistance towards adopting this construction 
technology.   
 
 
1.4  Problem statement 
 
The 2004 Division of Revenue Act3 mandates provinces 
and municipalities to adopt and use labour-intensive 
methods on appropriate infrastructure projects.  In 
2004 informal interviews conducted with representatives 
from Tshwane, Madibeng and Buffalo City municipalities 
revealed that Municipality representatives were 
struggling to incorporate the use of labour-intensive 
construction methods into the day to day running of 
infrastructure projects.  Another sentiment shared was 
that labour-intensive projects were reserved for 
‘special’ projects as they always presented problems 
relating to management of large labour forces on site.  
It was easier dealing with conventional equipment 
intensive projects.   
 
 
                                                 
3 Division of Revenue Act: Local Government Allocations 2004/2005, 
http://www.info.gov.za/notices/2004/26220/index.html sighted 
October 2005. 
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The negative perception and reluctance to conduct 
projects labour-intensively was found to be very 
disturbing given that it is at municipality level that 
the projects within programmes are actually 
implemented.  A closer look at some of the 
municipality’s projects where labour-intensive 
construction methods were attempted revealed inadequate 
planning, organising and management of the construction 
process as a result many problems were encountered 
during implementation.  At termination of the 
construction phase, there was no evidence that the 
projects had been evaluated to determine whether the 
project objectives had been met.  Although the use of 
labour-intensive construction methods is one of the 
requirements for municipalities applying for funding 
for infrastructure projects, there does not seem to be 
a system in place to enforce or monitor this 
requirement.     
 
 
1.5  Aim and Objectives of the report 
 
To date Madibeng Municipality has, to some extent, 
attempted to incorporate the objectives of the Expanded 
Public Works Programme into some of their 
infrastructure projects.  The aim of this research is 
to evaluate data from potable water reticulation 
infrastructure construction projects conducted in 
Madibeng Municipality where labour-intensive 
construction methods were conducted.   
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The objectives of the research are to: 
1. Establish the aims and objectives for the water 
supply projects; 
2. Document the experiences and findings of the 
projects; 
3. Analyse project findings and evaluate the project 
achievements in comparison to the intended 
objectives; and  
4. Document lessons learnt from the projects.   
 
 
It is the intention of this research to derive best 
practice from the findings of the evaluation of the 
projects which could assist decision makers and 
municipality representatives attempting labour-
intensive projects with no or limited experience.   
 
 
1.6  Scope and methodology 
 
Initially, discussions were conducted with 
representatives from Madibeng Municipality to determine 
the extent of the Municipality’s incorporation of the 
Expanded Public Works Programme into their day to day 
delivery.  The discussions were also to assess the 
problems encountered with labour-intensive projects 
conducted over the past four years.  This was done to 
justify the need for this research, and it was followed 
by a literature review of international and local 
experiences with respect to programmes and labour-
intensive projects.  The literature review was followed 
by collection of data on five potable water supply 
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projects conducted in Madibeng Municipality, namely: 
Brits Industrial Area, Maboloka and Environs Water 
Supply Scheme, Oskraal and Environs Water Supply Scheme 
which consists of the Madidi and Oskraal Plots phases, 
and Letlhakaneng.  The sample group was selected on the 
basis of data availability; this is a major limiting 
factor as most labour-intensive projects are not well 
documented.   
 
 
The following procedure was followed for assessment of 
the four completed projects:     
 
• Accumulation of data from available project 
documentation such as project close out reports, 
project plan reports, project communications like 
faxes, e-mails and letters and project contracts;   
• Personal interviews with two Madibeng Municipality 
representatives, three consultants and one 
contractor; and 
• Compilation of available data highlighting driving 
and restraining forces identified from the 
project. 
 
 
Field work was conducted on one project which was under 
construction during the time of research as follows: 
• Assembling of available information such as 
contract documentation, project plan reports from 
the Municipality and existing communication as 
found in consultant’s project files; and  
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• Personal interviews with one representative from 
Madibeng Municipality, two consultants, one 
Resident Engineer, one site agent, four labourers, 
one sub-contractor and three residents from the 
affected community (one man and two women) who 
were directly involved in the projects.  The 
participants were identified as key personnel from 
available project documentation.    
 
 
Compilation of data was then followed by evaluation of 
the project outcomes which was in-turn followed by 
documentation of lessons learnt.    
 
 
This research is based on only five projects where 
reasonable information could be found.  However, at 
times data was found to be incomplete and incompatible.  
In such cases information had to be calculated or 
deduced from other available sources such as close out 
reports, consultants or contractors where available.      
 
 
It was also disturbing that often the aims and 
objectives of the projects were not properly 
documented, but instead the author had to be extracted 
these from communication documents between the client, 
consultants and contractors and from the interviews 
conducted.  However, the construction costs stated in 
this report can be regarded as reliable as these were 
obtained from actual payment certificates, monthly 
progress reports and close out reports.    
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1.7  Structure of the report 
 
Against this background section, Chapter 2 will set the 
scene by presenting experiences from labour-intensive 
construction programmes conducted in other countries 
upon which the objectives and principles of labour-
intensive construction technology were founded.  This 
will form the basis for evaluating the labour-intensive 
projects in Madibeng Municipality.     
 
 
Chapter 3 will focus on literature on South Africa’s 
labour-intensive construction programmes.  Formal 
evaluations of the programmes will also be documented 
where available.  This chapter will focus on the 
Expanded Public Works Programme, the recent large scale 
programme under which two of the evaluated projects in 
Madibeng Municipality were conducted.  
 
 
Chapter 4 will discuss the five water reticulation 
infrastructure projects conducted in Madibeng 
Municipality.  The procedure followed to evaluate the 
projects includes documentation of available project 
information, followed by detailing of the project 
framework which includes contractual matters, training, 
health and safety and productivity.  The projects are 
then evaluated according to the primary objectives to 
determine whether they were successful or not.   
 
 
Chapter 5 provides an overall analysis of findings from 
the evaluated projects.  It then identifies the driving 
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and restraining forces which led to the outcome of the 
projects.     
 
 
Lastly, Chapter 6 draws conclusions based on the 
achievement of objectives of the five Madibeng 
Municipality projects.  It then documents lessons 
learnt and provides recommendations for the planning, 
organising and implementation of future projects, based 
on the experiences gained from the projects.  
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2 INTERNATIONAL LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
2.1  Introduction  
 
Labour-intensive construction is a topic of interest 
for many developing countries undertaking strategies to 
alleviate poverty and unemployment.  As a result, the 
topic has been extensively researched and a great deal 
of literature material is available on the subject.  In 
order to evaluate the labour-intensive projects 
conducted in Madibeng Municipality, it is important to 
understand what makes such progress successful and what 
fundamentals are necessary to enhance successful 
implementation.       
 
 
This chapter will discuss the use of labour-intensive 
construction methods in international programmes and 
the majority of the chapter will be dedicated to best 
practice and summary of reasons for successful 
implementation of such programmes.   
 
 
2.2  Best practices from international 
programmes  
 
The use of labour forces in the construction of 
infrastructure is not a new concept and can be traced 
as far back as the construction of major structures 
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namely: the Egyptian Pyramids4 and the Great Wall of 
China5, which are two of the seven construction wonders 
in the world. 
 
 
Later in the 1930’s, one of the solutions embarked on 
in America to alleviate the high unemployment problem 
brought about by the Great Depression, was to undertake 
large public works projects (Garraty, 1998).  Labourers 
employed to participate in these projects had little 
prior experience and learnt on the job, but managers 
and equipment operators usually had related prior 
experience and the workers with limited experience at 
the outset moved up to higher paying jobs that they 
learnt during the project.6  
                                                 
4 In the book, Science, the Universe and God: The Search for 
Truth, Keith Mayes highlights that today the construction industry 
is so used to employing machinery to conduct virtually all major 
construction work that it is sometimes forgotten that machinery is 
a relatively new development.  In the past, people relied on hand 
tools and innovation to achieve success in construction of 
structures.  For example, the Great Pyramid of Egypt was 
constructed hundreds of skilled workers who had limited 
construction machinery at their disposal.  Information was 
obtained from the website:    
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Egyptian_pyramids_construction_techni
ques sighted August 2006.  
 
5 Another example of the use of labour to construct magnificent 
structures is the Great Wall of China which built by millions of 
workers who toiled under arduous work and poor living and 
construction conditions.  The successful construction of the wall 
was again achieved by the use of proper management of the labour 
force and appropriate design and construction methods.  
Information was obtained from the website 
http://www.travelchinaguide.com/china_great_wall/construction/labo
r_force.htm sighted August 2006. 
 
6 Information from an article by Andrew J. Dunar who teaches 
history at the University of Alabama in Huntsville. He is the co-
author of Building Hoover Dam: An Oral History of the Great 
Depression obtained from 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/goldengate/sfeature/sf_30s.html 
sighted July 2005.  No date of publication of article found.     
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In South Africa example of the use of large labour 
forces in infrastructure is the so called ‘Poor White 
Problem’7 in South Africa where many roads on the 
Witwatersrand were built by hand to relieve poverty 
after the great depression and drought in the 1930’s 
(Abedian and Standish, 1985).    
 
 
For more than three decades developing countries such 
as Kenya, Botswana and Lesotho have embarked on large 
scale labour-intensive construction programmes which 
have resulted in thousands of kilometres of roads and 
years of productive employment.  Evaluation of these 
programmes has led to delineation of a set of 
principles governing the successful implementation of 
labour-intensive construction methods.  During this 
work other issues were identified as having a bearing 
upon labour-intensive work, including the nature of 
work and the level of technology within the society 
involved in technology transfer, the type and extent of 
training required, the need for targeting the poor and 
the distinction between labour-intensive work and 
emergency, drought and/or relief efforts (McCutcheon, 
2003:15-56). 
 
 
The construction industry has been known to generate 
employment for under/un-skilled local communities in 
                                                 
7 Extracts from the Preamble of “Labour-intensive strategy and 
framework manual for implementation of infrastructure projects in 
Gauteng”, 2003, prepared for the Department of Public Transport, 
Roads and Works. 
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the past.  However, over the past century or so, 
conventional construction methods have become 
increasingly capital intensive, resulting in lesser 
employment opportunities per unit of expenditure.  Thus 
throughout the industry an increase in expenditure has 
generally resulted in the generation of less employment 
per unit of expenditure than formally (McCutcheon et 
al, 2003). 
 
 
Extensive literature is available on the substitution 
of labour8 for equipment in which the feasibility of 
the reverse substitution of labour for equipment was 
analysed.  Some of the key findings from the early 
phase of the study included the fact that substitution 
was technically feasible for road construction.  The 
economic feasibility depended on relative factor prices 
and factor productivities under different conditions.  
However, the data normally available was found to be 
inappropriately structured or too poorly defined with 
respect to environmental conditions to permit a 
quantitative analysis of the substitution 
possibilities.   
 
 
Subsequent phases established that labour-intensive 
construction methods were in fact technical feasible 
for a wide range of construction activities and could 
                                                 
8 1971 the World Bank launched the Study of the Substitution of 
Labour and Equipment in Civil Construction in order to investigate 
the value of using appropriate construction methods for socio-
economic benefit of countries with abundant labour and scares 
financial resources.  The findings of the study is documented in 
the report: The Study of the Substitution of labour and equipment 
in civil construction (SOL) (April 1986)  – A research and 
implementation project, Project completion report.   
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generally produce the same quality of products as 
equipment intensive methods.  Other findings included 
the fact that labour productivity could be increased 
through better organisation and management, better 
tools and light equipment and through the upgrading of 
the health and nutritional status of the workers.    
 
  
Further research into labour-intensive construction 
methods was conducted by McCleary et al (1976).  During 
the study a cost-benefit analysis was conducted using 
shadow prices9 for alternative technologies of gravel 
road construction in Thailand.  The study concluded 
that labour-intensive construction methods could be 
competitive with machine based ones at shadow prices 
and that the former could be cheaper at shadow prices 
if higher labour productivity could be achieved. 
 
 
Deepak et al (1978) conducted a study in the 
Philippines which compared various machine-labour 
combinations for road construction.  Productivities and 
costs were obtained from field studies on pilot studies 
of labour-intensive gravel construction.  Analyses were 
made of alternative labour-intensive methods for 
excavation and haulage, and shadow prices were derived 
for various inputs.  Labour-intensive construction 
methods were found to be more economically viable than 
                                                 
9 Shadow price is defined as the change in the objective value of 
the optimal solution on an optimisation problem obtained by 
relaxing the constraint by one unit.  For example, a shadow price 
is the maximum price that management is willing to pay for an 
extra unit of a given limited resource.  The value of shadow price 
can provide a decision maker with powerful insight into problems. 
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machine-intensive construction at both market and 
shadow prices. 
 
 
The findings and experiences from the abovementioned 
studies, and others not included in this report, were 
documented and compiled into lessons learnt and reasons 
for success.  According to McCutcheon (2003), the 
following factors were considered to be the main 
reasons for their success: 
• Major policy and decision makers understood the 
concepts and principles of labour-intensive work 
and the principles of long-term programmes.   
• Programmes were long-term and national and were 
not ad hoc projects.   
• There was a sound intellectual assessment of the 
technical feasibility and economic efficiency of 
labour-intensive method: cognisance was taken of 
technological and institutional capacities.  The 
principles of labour-intensive work were 
incorporated into daily work.   
• Technical, institutional, organisational, 
managerial and socio-economic aspects received 
concentrated attention during preliminary work, 
continued through pilot projects, embryonic 
training programmes and subsequent large scale, 
national programmes.  
• Strong organisations were established with good 
management systems: a balance was achieved between 
decentralisation and centralisation.  
• Training was extensive and good at what it set out 
to do, that is the training of hands-on site 
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supervisors/road builders, multi-site supervisors, 
clerks, vehicle/tractor drivers and artisans. 
• There was long-term political support. 
• Long-term financial commitment was provided by 
government and donors. 
• On balance there was good co-ordination between 
government, government departments, those 
administering the programme, local authorities, 
those providing technical assistance and donors.  
Independent evaluation assisted as did the 
continuity and commitment provided by particular 
individuals. 
 
 
Furthermore, programmes have to be conducted in a 
logical and methodological manner to ensure good 
organisation, planning, management, monitoring and 
control.  According to McCutcheon (2003), the 
establishment of a programme for large scale 
replication of innovatory work would be possible 
through the following phases: 
 
 
Phase 1:  Orientation which includes reaching consensus 
with all parties concerning policy objectives, types of 
different projects in one programme, method of 
construction, conditions of employment and many other 
factors.  During this stage, it is critical that all 
stakeholders have an understanding of the concepts and 
principles of labour-intensive work. 
Phase 2:  Preparatory work during which analysis of the 
institutional structure, organisation, levels of 
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funding, specific technical analyses, criteria for 
staff recruitment, identification of initial 
communities and training sites are investigated.  
Preparatory work includes the design, specification, 
documentation, administrative, technical and training 
manuals, selection of trainees, briefing of communities 
and prioritising.   
 
 
Phase 3:  Pilot/Initial training which involves pilot 
and/or demonstration projects incorporating an 
embryonic training programme.   
 
 
Phase 4:  Expanded training which is the expansion of 
the pilot and demonstration projects and training 
programmes into a large scale local, provincial and/or 
national programme.  It is crucial that expansion only 
occur at a rate at which the programmes is able to 
produce the skilled human resources required, local 
communities and institutions have the capacity to 
absorb the trained personnel and the 
national/provincial institution is able to absorb the 
trained management personnel and maintain its overall 
role in relation to budget, planning, coordination, 
monitoring and control.   
 
 
These phases are necessary because of the absence of an 
existing labour-intensive industry, the low level of 
existing skills and the lack of institutional capacity 
at local, provincial and national levels. 
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2.3  Conclusion  
 
An overview of sub Saharan experiences indicates that 
programmes of labour-intensive construction and 
maintenance of physical infrastructure have achieved 
the following complementary development objectives 
(McCutcheon, 1999):   
• A significant increase in employment generation 
per unit of expenditure; 
• The construction and maintenance of technically 
sound and economically efficient assets; 
• The development of individual skills: technical, 
supervisory, managerial and entrepreneurial; and  
• The building of institutional capacity at local, 
regional and national levels. 
 
 
International evidence has shown that large scale, well 
managed labour-intensive public works programmes can 
create significant employment and at the same time 
generate infrastructure of required quality.  On the 
contrary, inadequate planning and hasty implementation 
leads to failure of programmes and the following are 
some of the lessons learnt from international 
programmes (McCutcheon, 2003).  
 
• The use of labour-intensive construction methods 
in carrying out programmes for construction of 
infrastructure combined with labour-intensive 
maintenance generates significant full-time jobs.  
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• Good flow of communication between workers, 
supervisors, clients, consultants and affected 
communities is crucial for the successful 
implementation of labour-intensive construction 
methods. 
• Monitoring and feedback systems should be 
developed to ensure that all stakeholders 
understand their responsibility, roles and 
expectations.   
• It is very important to train contractors prior to 
commencement of works.     
• Findings of studies in which the impact of labour-
intensive construction methods were compared with 
conventional construction methods indicate that 
labour-intensive projects create more than twice 
the number of jobs, can be at least 30% less 
expensive, and reduce the use of foreign exchange.  
• The success of labour-intensive programmes depends 
on the minimum wage rate applied.  If too high, 
the programme will be too expensive and if too 
low, the programme will struggle to attract and 
retain the required labour force.  
• The programmes have to adhere to the country’s 
legal requirements and any special exemptions or 
requirements required should be communicated and 
arranged in advance with the relevant policy 
makers.  
• Labourers have to be paid in cash and on time. 
• It is imperative that, as far as possible, payment 
should be linked to work completed. 
• Independence from expatriate skills eliminates 
cost associated with recruiting expatriates.  
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Experiences and lessons learnt have provided pertinent 
foundation for sound decision making for some 
subsequent labour-intensive programmes and projects 
which are discussed in Chapter 3.  Lessons learnt from 
these past experiences have been adopted where best 
practice assists with the scope definition, setting of 
objectives, and creating the necessary environment and 
support for new programmes, with the aim of increasing 
the chances of successful implementation.  
 
 
The findings from this chapter will form the basis for 
assessing whether the water reticulation projects from 
Madibeng Municipality, to be evaluated in later 
chapters, were conducted in a manner which supports the 
choice of construction method.  With this background, 
it will be possible to determine and isolate factors 
which contribute to the success or failure of the 
projects.  The list of reasons for success from 
international programmes will therefore be used as a 
checklist against which the projects are assessed 
taking into consideration the unique circumstances 
governing every project. 
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3 SOUTH AFRICAN LITERATURE REVIEW ON 
LABOUR-INTENSIVE CONSTRUCTION  
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
Creation of jobs for the large unskilled labour force 
in South Africa has become one of the priorities of the 
country’s government.  The unemployment problem is 
often identified with the rural areas and because these 
areas often have no or inadequate public 
infrastructure, the scope of creation of employment 
through investing in construction of infrastructure 
assets by using labour-intensive construction methods 
is appealing.    
 
 
Over the years, the high unemployment rates in South 
Africa have facilitated the expanded use of labour-
intensive construction methods in the construction 
industry.  Unlike the international programmes 
discussed in previous chapters, the use of labour-
intensive construction methods in the country was not 
limited to low volume roads, but also extended to a 
wider range of other infrastructure projects.   
 
  
This chapter discusses former and current programmes 
undertaken by the South African government in its 
endeavours to use large labour forces in the 
construction industry in an attempt to alleviate the 
unemployment problem.  The chapter then documents the 
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reasons for success and failure of the programmes and 
focuses on the current national programme, the Expanded 
Public Works Programme.  In addition, the chapter will 
also discuss estimations for the cost to labour for 
labour-intensive programmes as compared to conventional 
construction methods.  This will set a benchmark to 
evaluate whether the cost to labour in the Madibeng 
Municipality projects to be evaluated was significantly 
increased as compared to conventional construction 
methods.   
 
 
3.2  South African labour-intensive programmes  
 
Over the past three decades, billions of rands have 
been spent on projects and so called programmes with 
stated objectives of creating employment and providing 
infrastructure (Thwala, 2001).  The sub-sections below 
will briefly discuss programmes such as Zibambele, 
Gundo Lashu, Zivuseni, the National Public Works 
Programme and its Community Based Public Works 
Programme and the Expanded Public Works Programme.   
 
 
3.2.1 National Public Works Programme  
 
Early in 1992, a senior member of the South African 
Federation of Civil Engineering Contractors (SAFCEC) 
realised that greater use of labour-intensive methods 
of construction could alleviate unemployment and bring 
more work into an industry that had been crippled with 
recession, cutback in government spending and civil war 
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(McCutcheon,2001).  Subsequent meetings conducted 
between representatives of several civil engineering 
industries, and later the Congress of South African 
Trade Unions (COSATU), led to the drafting of a 
Framework Agreement in which the industry committed 
itself to maximise the use of labour-intensive systems 
of construction within public works programmes and the 
trade unions agreed to the linking of payment to 
production in public works.   
 
 
During this time, the South African government was 
embarking on the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme and one of the main thrust of this programme 
was to link reconstruction and development through an 
infrastructural programme.  The key area where special 
measures to create jobs could link to building the 
economy and meeting basic needs would be in redressing 
apartheid-created infrastructural disparities 
(McCutcheon, 2001).     
 
 
A Technical Focus Group was appointed and its primary 
task was to identify those sectors of public works 
infrastructure in which labour-intensive production 
methods may be successfully developed and also to make 
estimates of the potential employment creation 
resulting from the National Public Works Programme.  
The results were accepted by the government as the 
basis for the National Public Works Programme10. 
                                                 
10 Information on the National Public Works Programme was obtained 
mostly from McCutcheon  R.T. (2001), Employment generation in 
public works: recent South African experience.   
 
  
 
30
 
 
In August 1994, the South African Government of 
National Unity launched a National Public Works 
Programme11 which was based on proposals generated 
through a widely participatory detailed study by the 
National Economic Forum during the first half of 
199412, which in turn had grown out of deliberations 
carried out by the Employment Task Force of the 
National Consultative Forum on Drought and incorporated 
into the Reconstruction and Development Programme.  The 
pre-investment work for this programme was taken 
forward by the National Economic Forum.  The 
responsibility of the National Public Works Programme 
was allocated to the National Department of Public 
Works.  
 
 
The main objectives of the National Public Works 
Programme (McCutcheon, 2001) were to:  
• Reduce unemployment through the creation of 
productive labour absorbing jobs and opportunities 
                                                 
11 J. Radebe, Minister of Public Works, Press Release "National 
Public Works Programme", (Pretoria: Department of Public Works, 4 
August 1994). 
12 -National Economic Forum:  Technical Committee on a Public 
Works Programme (NEFTC),,  February 1994. 
-National Economic Forum:  Technical Committee on a Public Works 
Programme (NEFTC), National Employment Creation Programme for the 
Provision of Public Infrastructure Using Labour Intensive Methods 
(National Public Works Programme) Pre-Investment Investigation:  
Proceedings of Workshop, February 10 and 11 1994 (Johannesburg: 
NEF, February 1994). 
-National Economic Forum:  Technical Committee on a Public Works 
Programme (NEFTC),  Pre-investment Investigation:  Report of the 
Technical Focus Group (Co-convenors:  R.T. McCutcheon and S. 
Phillips) (Johannesburg:  NEF, April 1994). 
-National Economic Forum:  Technical Committee on a Public Works 
Programme (NEFTC), Final Report (Johannesburg: NEF, June 1994). 
  
 
31
for local contractors, through labour-intensive 
approaches; 
• Educate and train those on the programme as a 
means of economic empowerment; 
• Create, rehabilitate and maintain physical assets, 
clinics, schools, crèches and roads, which serve 
to meet the basic needs of poor communities and 
promote broader economic activity; and  
• Build capacity of communities to manage their own 
affairs, strengthen the local government and other 
institutions and generate sustainable economic 
development.   
 
 
Thirteen key principles were defined to guide the 
implementation of the National Public Works Programme 
of which five were singled out for more detailed 
delineation: labour-intensity, community empowerment, 
education and training, sustainability and planning and 
monitoring and evaluation.   
 
 
The infrastructure provision of the state was carried 
out in a way that also maximised productive employment, 
training and capacity building, and community 
employment.   
 
 
There were two strategic thrusts: 
1) A programme to re-orient public expenditure on 
infrastructure and transform the institutional capacity 
of the function of national, provincial and local 
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government to ensure larger scale job creation, skills 
development and capacity building in forthcoming years. 
2) A Community-Based Public Works Programme (henceforth 
referred to as the CBPWP) to ensure short term funding 
to a variety of government and non-government 
organisations provided they meet the criteria 
consistent with the objectives of the National Public 
Works Programme.  This fund would focus on creating 
employment and alleviating poverty in the short-term, 
while the capacity is built to deliver jobs in a cost 
effective manner through normal expenditure on 
infrastructure projects.   
 
 
The objectives of the CBPWP were: 
• Short-term delivery of employment opportunities 
and infrastructure particularly in rural areas; 
• Target the most needy, especially rural women and 
youth; 
• Kick start the National Public Works Programme by 
building capacity (at provincial and local 
levels); and  
• Demonstrate to government departments and the 
private sector how sustainable infrastructure 
could be delivered without large scale use of 
machinery and without sacrificing standards.   
 
 
The programmes were rolled out and after implementation 
several evaluations were conducted to determine whether 
the objectives of the National Public Works Programme 
had been achieved through the employ of the millions of 
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rands expended during implementation.  One of the 
positive outcomes of the National Public Works 
Programme was that the work conducted by the Department 
of Public Works had led to policy development and the 
establishment of a framework for future progress.    
 
 
According to McCutcheon (2001), employment generation 
for conventional construction of infrastructure had 
been estimated at 14 000 per billion rand of investment 
and over a five-year period the labour-intensive 
methods were expected to result in an increase in 
employment opportunities of between 300% and 500%.  
However, in 1995 the civil engineering industry had 
employed 64 424 people at R6 billion turnover and in 
1998 employed 75 387 people at R9 million turnover at 
current prices (McCutcheon, 2001).  In other words, the 
employ of labour-intensive methods had only generated 
10 737 jobs per billion rands expenditure in 1995 and 
this figure declined to only 8 376 per billion rand 
expenditure in 1998. 
 
 
Also, according to McCutcheon (2001) another problem 
which contributed to the unsatisfactory performance of 
the National Public Works Programme was the fact that 
the Department of Public Works, which had traditionally 
been the state’s landlord, did not have the skills and 
experience of handling projects related to construction 
and maintenance of major physical infrastructure.  This 
responsibility generally lay with the departments of 
Transport and Water affairs.   
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In addition, it was hoped that focus on the development 
of small contractors would increase overall 
empowerment, however, this yielded no noticeable effect 
on the overall empowerment and no published data was 
available on the number of small contractors who 
operated in the National Public Works Programme.  
According to McCutcheon (2001), the National Public 
Works Programme made no allowance for a development 
programme for these contractors despite international 
experience which indicated that 75% of small businesses 
fail.   
 
 
Assessment of the funds allocated to the CPWP 
(Mthombeni, 1995) revealed the following: 
 
• The bulk of the funding was spent on “shelf” 
projects, i.e. previously identified projects that 
had already been designed and specified.  These 
projects had not been conceived from an employment 
generation perspective.   
• Little coherent training, technical development 
and capacity building were carried out. 
• There were wide disparities in wage rates and 
conditions of employment. 
• Monitoring and evaluation systems were not 
established.   
• There were institutional difficulties within the 
Department of Public Works and its provincial 
department. 
• There was a lack of understanding of the role of 
the CPWP in relation to the National Public Works 
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Programme, in particular its role as a pilot 
programme for the National Public Works Programme.  
The National Public Works Programme was envisaged 
to last over ten years; however, the lifespan of 
the CPWP was not clearly spelt out.  As a result, 
the CPWP was expected to develop capacity of the 
provinces in its first year of operation which, by 
reference to relevant experience was not a 
realistic time frame.     
 
 
In order to evaluate the quality of physical assets 
resulting from the National Public Works Programme, in 
1995 a Quality of Assets investigation was initiated by 
National Public Works Programme Task Team (Phillips et 
al, 1995b).  The study aimed to evaluate a selection of 
Community Employment Programme (CEP) in order to verify 
the reports of quality problems, try to define minimum 
technical problems, identify causes of quality problems 
and identify reasons for success, and make 
recommendations for actions to limit quality problems 
in future CPWP projects.  The study found that only 26% 
of the projects evaluated had no quality problems with 
the rest having quality problems varying from minor to 
serious.  The study also revealed that some engineers 
(and facilitators) had insufficient knowledge of 
appropriate technology and labour-intensive 
construction, which in some cases led to extremely low 
task productivities, adversely affected the cost 
effectiveness of projects.   
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During 1992, the National Consultative Forum of Drought 
set up an Employment Task Force which explored short 
term (Phillips et al, 1995a) and long-term options to 
achieve these goals.  In relation to the long term, it 
made recommendations as to the pre-investment work that 
needed to be carried out for a National Employment 
Creation programme using labour-intensive methods for 
the construction and maintenance of public 
infrastructure.   
 
   
In addition, and of particular interest and direct 
significance to projects from Madibeng Municipality 
which are to be evaluated later in this report, the 
Technical Focus Group found that there were a number of 
sectors of infrastructure in which labour-intensive 
construction methods may be introduced and developed 
under the National Public Works Programme.  Phillips et 
al (1995a) found that there is a great potential for 
using highly labour-intensive methods in construction 
of many infrastructure projects including dams, 
railways, supply and sanitation systems.  However, 
owing to the high material costs involved, the 
percentage of construction costs to labour in this 
sector would not be as high as in some other sectors 
such as roads. 
 
 
A model of the National Public Works Programme was 
developed in order to examine optimum employment 
creation in projects and the resulting maximum spending 
which can be achieved when compared to conventional 
spending on labour is presented in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1  Spending on targeted labour as percentage of spending 
on labour, plant and material 
Sector Current  spending  
Maximum  
spending 
Projects with low capacity building requirements  60%–80% 60%–80% 
Low-cost housing 25%–35% 30%-40% 
Social buildings 20%-30% 25%–35% 
Water reticulation 5%–15% 25%–35% 
Stormwater 5%–15% 40%–50% 
Sanitation 5%–15% 25%–35% 
Roads 5%–15% 30%–80% 
Dams 10%–20% 50%–80% 
Railways 5%–15% 20%–30% 
Forestry 25%–35% 35%–45% 
Electrification 10%–15% 12%–17% 
Small scale agriculture-related infrastructure 40%–80% 40%–80% 
Source: Table 3 Technical analysis of employment creation 
potential of a National Public Works Programme (Phillips et al, 
1995) 
 
 
Examples of projects with low capacity building 
requirements are painting public buildings and one-off 
refuse collection exercises.  Such projects are 
conventionally highly labour-intensive and hence there 
is little room for increasing labour intensity.  
Similarly, the construction of small scale agriculture-
related infrastructure is conventionally highly labour-
intensive, and hence there is little potential for 
increasing labour intensivity.  
     
 
According to Table 3.1 above, conventionally the cost 
to labour (as compared to the total project cost) of 
water reticulation projects was only 5% to 15%, but if 
labour-intensive construction methods were used the 
cost to labour could be significantly increased to 25% 
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to 35%.  These figures will be used as a benchmark to 
determine whether optimum employment was created in the 
five water reticulation projects in Madibeng 
Municipality to be evaluated in later chapters. 
  
 
3.2.2 Gundo Lashu  
 
Gundo Lashu13 was launched in 2001 by the Roads Agency 
Limpopo (RAL) to improve transport infrastructure in 
poor and previously disadvantaged rural areas in 
Limpopo. It was the aim of the programme to increase 
accessibility of communities to services such as health 
and education.  The primary objective of Gundo Lashu 
was to provide good quality, cost-effective rural roads 
using labour-intensive construction methods.  
 
 
The objectives of the programme were to: 
• Develop and train at least 24 local contractors 
using labour-intensive methods and thereby bring 
300km of rural roads up to RAL standards; 
• Engage rural communities and generate 1 million 
workdays of employment (40% male, 60% female), 
hence improving livelihoods for communities 
participating in the programme; and 
• Strengthen the capacity of the RAL to manage, 
monitor and evaluate the implementation of Gundo 
                                                 
13  All facts and data presented under the Gundo Lashu sub-section 
was obtained from an article titled Gundo Lashu – Labour-intensive 
Rural Roads Programme obtained from the Government Innovators 
Network website www.innovations.harvard.edu/awards.html?id=6014  
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Lashu in accordance with corporate governance best 
practice.   
 
 
Gundo Lashu was the first long-term labour-intensive 
public works road sector programme in South Africa, 
where emerging contractors were given extensive formal 
training and a series of practical on-site training 
projects in labour-intensive road works over a period 
of 21 months.  Poor households without any income were 
targeted first to ensure that a wider net of families 
gained the positive effects of this programme.  Twenty-
four contractors were trained under the programme and  
2 400 people who had no income received a monthly 
remuneration14 through the creation of 320 000 workdays 
that were created through the programme.    
 
 
For each project, the contractors employed between 60 
and 100 local workers on a task-based payment system 
where workers were paid R30/task.  Due to the 
occasional nature of road upgrading projects, the 
duration of employment of the workers was approximately 
four months.  On average 51% of workers were women, 58% 
youth and 1% disabled.  All the workers were provided 
with both on-the-job training and formal training 
funded by the Department of Labour.  The formal 
training covered topics ranging from life skills to 
basic agriculture.  
 
                                                 
14 Payment was task based.  In other words, the contracting 
households were paid based on the amount of work completed in 
their assigned section of the road.   
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By 2004, the budget for the programme was R50 million 
and it was achieving a 600% increase in employment 
compared to similar conventional machine-intensive road 
works without increasing the overall cost per kilometre 
(Phillips, 2004).  
 
 
Taylor et al (2005) conducted a study in which a 
preliminary comparison was conducted between the cost 
of using labour-intensive and conventional construction 
methods for rural road improvement in the programme.  
The study found that the cost of machine-based and 
labour-based methods was broadly similar according to a 
financial analysis, but labour-intensive methods were 
found to be cheaper than machine-based methods when 
using shadow wage rates.  The study also found that 
labour-based methods contributed 28% more than machine-
based methods directly and indirectly in terms of GDP, 
increased employment six times and had a greater impact 
on the income of poor households.  
 
 
The labour-intensive methods were also found to 
encourage setting up of small businesses, generation of 
self employment, increased social stability and lower 
levels of crime, and improvement in nutrition and 
education; however these benefits depended critically 
on sustained employment opportunities and complementary 
output, as well as effective targeting of employment to 
the poor.  
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No information could be found in the reviewed 
literature on the resulting level of service and 
quality of roads achieved through the programme.  
 
 
3.2.3 Zivuseni Programme 
 
The Zivuseni programme15 was launched in 2002 in Gauteng 
with the aim of alleviating poverty by providing short-
term employment and training to the unemployed by 
creating jobs in the maintenance and refurbishment of 
government buildings such as schools and hospitals.  
 
 
The workers were appointed on contract at R40/day for 
three months and were provided with personal protective 
equipment.  The projected budget for the programme was 
R50 million in 2003, which would double to  
R100 million in 2004 and then would increase by  
R50 million in the subsequent year.   
 
 
Based on the limited literature reviewed, it was 
established that no evaluation was conducted on the 
programme.  This can be said to be typical of relief 
programme mentality.  As a result the impact of the 
programme on the targeted communities could not be 
                                                 
15 Facts on the Zivuseni Programme was obtained from the following 
sources: 
An article by Thomas Thale “Thousands line up for government 
jobs”, 10 June 2002 from the City of Johannesburg website 
www.joburg.org.za sighted in November 2005.   
Transformation of provincial routine road maintenance unit in 
South Africa, 2004, Proceedings of the 8th conference Asphalt 
pavements for South Africa, Sun City, South Africa 
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assessed as far as the number of people trained, the 
extent and quality of infrastructure produced, the 
number of jobs created or social impact.   
 
 
Although this programme was not strictly a construction 
programme, it was included in the literature review to 
illustrate the challenge of finding information even in 
major provincial labour-intensive programmes.  Although 
jobs were created during implementation of this 
programme, the quality of work or value added by the 
millions of rands expended on this programme does not 
appear to have been evaluated and it is not clear as to 
whether the aims and objectives of the programme were 
met.        
 
 
3.2.4 Zibambele Road Maintenance  
 
The Zibambele Roads Maintenance System16 was introduced 
in rural KwaZulu-Natal in 1999.  The KwaZulu-Natal 
Department of Transport in its Road to Wealth and 
Creation determined that more than 14 000km of rural 
roads required maintenance; and this coupled with the 
national objective of alleviating poverty saw the 
development and launch of the Zibambele Programme in 
January 2000 (Taylor Parkins, 2006).   
                                                 
16 Information in this sub-section was obtained from the following 
sources: 
1. Taylor Parkins, F. Strategic Consideration for large scale 
labour-intensive maintenance programme version 1.0.0 May 2006; and 
2. An article “Zibambele Road Maintenance – 2000 Winner: KwaZulu-
Natal Province, South Africa” from the Government Innovators 
Network website www.innovations.havard.edu/awards.html?id sighted 
November 2005. Author is unknown.  
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The programme involved contracting the maintenance of 
rural access roads to households, who were responsible 
for a certain length of road for a period of one year. 
The programme used labour-intensive road maintenance 
methods to provide an income to poor families.  
 
 
The programme aimed to employ 40 000 contractors 
(households) and cover some 17 000km of road by 2009, 
which was intended to contribute to stabilising the 
poverty of the estimated 500 000 destitute households 
in rural KwaZulu-Natal. 
 
 
The length of road allocated to each household depended 
on the difficulty of the terrain, but in general 
contractors tended between 600m and 1 500m of road.  
The limiting factor used to determine the length of 
road allocated to a household was that maintenance 
activities should not exceed 60 hours17 a month to 
allow income to be spread more widely, and to allow 
contracting households time for other activities. 
 
 
The Zibambele programme was a gender affirming 
programme, with more than 98% of contracts in 2000 
being given to women headed households.  The contracted 
households were chosen by the community themselves, who 
identified families who were most in need of 
                                                 
17 In other words, the length of section of road allocated to a 
household was determined in such a way that the tasks required to 
maintain that section of road would necessitate a maximum of 60 
hours a month to accomplish.  It is important to recall that 
payment was based on productivity and not on time spent.   
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assistance.  The contracted household then supplied a 
person to work on the road for 2 days/week, and was 
supplied with a set of tools and basic training.  In 
addition to maintaining the road surface, drainage 
system and verges, contractors were responsible for the 
removal of litter and noxious weeds from the roads.  
Tasks were set and monitored by an overseer who 
typically looked after 130 contracts and reported 
monthly on progress.  The overseers were in turn 
managed by a social consultant and a technical 
consultant who reported to the department.  
 
 
During 1999/2000, a total of 2 700 contracts were 
awarded with the ultimate target of 40 000 contracts at 
the end of the programme.  By December 2004, the 
contractors were receiving a total monthly income of 
R370.00 for the successful implementation of the 
maintenance of the allocated section of road.  The 
present rate of remuneration is R390.00 per month 
(Taylor Parkins, 2006).  A total of 14 800 contracts 
had been awarded in the 2003/2004 financial year as 
compared to the original target of 14 000.  By August 
2005, 25 267 Zibambele contracts had been awarded  
(24 004 of whom were women and 1 253 male) and these 
contractors maintain 15 423km of KwaZulu-Natal’s rural 
road network (Taylor Parkins, 2006).  According to 
Taylor Parkins, at present payments to the contractors 
has amounted to R278.3 million since the launch of the 
programme.    
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The programme not only provided income for poor 
households, it also provided other secondary, yet 
important benefits, such as, assistance to obtain 
identity documents (ID), opening banking accounts, 
setting up savings clubs and accessing credit, with a 
view to allowing a member of the household to start a 
small business. 
 
 
The cost effectiveness of the programme was evaluated 
by McCord (2002) and it was concluded that the 
programme was cost-effective in terms of transferring 
resources from the state to recipients, the proportion 
of programme costs spent on labour and the cost of the 
creation of a day’s work. 
 
   
According to Strebel (2004), a social impact study 
conducted on the programme indicated considerable 
satisfaction with the programme among affected 
communities.   According to the study the programme had 
allowed many household heads to meet basic needs, such 
as nutrition, health care and schooling.  The findings 
indicated that 99% of participants considered the 
selection process for contractors fair or very fair, 
96% felt that life had changed because of the 
programme, 94% were proud to work for Zibambele and 81% 
thought that the project had improved their quality of 
life.  Many also expressed increased optimism for the 
future as a result of working for Zibambele, and saw it 
as restoring the human dignity of households.   
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Once more, no information was available on technical 
evaluation of the quality of products resulting from 
the programme.  One of the aims of the programme was to 
maintain the road at a specified level of service; 
however the literature reviewed could not establish 
whether the required level of service was achieved.  In 
spite of this, because payment was linked to 
productivity, it could be safe to assume, by 
implication, that the resulting services were 
considered to be of acceptable quality.      
 
 
3.2.5 Expanded Public Works Programme  
 
The Expanded Public Works Programme18 was formally 
announced by President Mbeki in his State of the Nation 
Address in February 2003 and was later launched in May 
2004 in Giyani, Limpopo.  The programme is a short to 
medium term intervention by the government, through the 
Department of Public Works, aimed at alleviating 
unemployment in South Africa. The programme is a 
nationwide programme which will draw significant 
numbers of the unemployed into productive work so that 
workers gain skills while working, hence increasing 
their capacity to earn an income.   
 
 
                                                 
18 Background information on the EPWP was sourced from Philips 
(2004), McCutcheon et al (2006), A Glendinning’s 2005 presentation 
on the “The Expanded Public Works Programme” prepared on behalf of 
the Department of Public Works and the First 2005/06 quarterly 
report, Financial Year 2005/061 April 2005 – 30 June 2005 as per 
01 November 2005. 
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The Expanded Public Works Programme’s goal is to create 
work opportunities (coupled with training) for a 
minimum of one million people in South Africa in the 
first five years of the programme, i.e. by 2009 
(Department of Public Works, 2005). 
 
 
The programme takes advantage of the abundant labour 
resources in the country and the limited financial 
resources, targeting people with no or low level of 
skills who currently do not have any employment 
opportunities.  This is achieved by realigning 
government expenditure in such a way that a 
considerable portion of resources contribute towards 
employment creation and not only to the provision of 
infrastructure.   
 
 
The objectives of the programmes are: 
• To increase the contribution of public sector 
expenditure on goods and services to the 
alleviation of unemployment; 
• To provide (unskilled) unemployed people with a 
combination of work experience and training; and 
• To deliver quality, cost effective services using 
labour-intensive techniques.  
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The programme is a cross-cutting initiative covering 
all spheres of government and affects the following 
sectors: 
- Environmental & culture sector (e.g. environmental 
improvement programmes); 
- Infrastructure sector (labour-intensive 
construction and maintenance); 
- Social sector (home-based care and early childhood 
development); and  
- Economic sector (small business development, 
income generating projects). 
 
 
In the infrastructure and environment & culture 
sectors, the focus is on the substitution of labour for 
machines. The social sector is by its nature labour-
intensive, while the economic sector focuses on the 
creation of emerging entrepreneurs. 
 
 
There is no special funding for the programme from 
government, but the emphasis is on changing the way in 
which normal expenditure occurs to simultaneously 
provide services and physical infrastructure while 
creating employment opportunities for the unemployed; 
at the same time linking employment to training and 
skills development.  The Municipal Infrastructure Grant 
(MIG) (which succeeded the Consolidated Municipal 
Infrastructure Programme (CMIP)) is one of the 
mechanisms for the delivery of infrastructure and these 
funds are to be utilised for the implementation of the 
Expanded Public Works Programme objectives.  In other 
words, an Expanded Public Works Programme project would 
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be one where deliberate attempt is made by the public 
sector body to use its expenditure on goods and 
services to create additional work opportunities for 
the unemployed.   
 
 
In the infrastructure sector, R15 billion of the 
conditional infrastructure grants allocated to 
provinces and municipalities over five years has been 
earmarked for the Expanded Public Works Programme.  In 
addition, R4 billion has been earmarked on the 
environmental sector departments budgets for 
environmental Expanded Public Works Programme 
programmes and at least R600 million allocated to 
social sector Expanded Public Works Programme 
programmes over the next five years (i.e. 2009). 
 
 
Initially, it was envisaged that the focus 
infrastructure to be constructed from the Expanded 
Public Works Programme’s R15 billion would include low 
cost, low volume urban and rural roads, stormwater 
drainage, pedestrian sidewalks and cycle paths and 
trenches.  However, McCutcheon et al (2006a) argue that 
in no way does this initial focus limit the type of 
projects to those mentioned above, but it is hoped that 
some authorities will engage on higher standard work, 
expanding the use of labour-intensive construction 
methods and hence creating more jobs.   
 
 
Central to the structure of the Expanded Public Works 
Programme is the provision of training to previously 
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unemployed beneficiaries, and Vuk’uphile, the Expanded 
Public Works Programme Contractor Learnership 
Programme, is one of its flagship programmes.  This 
learnership programme has been developed to build 
capacity amongst emerging contractors to equip them 
with the skills to execute the increasing amount of 
labour-intensive work that forms part of the Expanded 
Public Works Programme and is managed by the National 
Department of Public Works, Construction Education and 
Training Authority (CETA), Independent Development 
Trust, and ABSA. 
 
 
Training involves formal institutional training as well 
as work place training over a two year period.  The on-
the-job training is provided in the form of ring fenced 
contracts issued by an implementing municipality.  The 
learners are supported by financial institutions such 
as ABSA to assist with access to finance and to develop 
a financial track record.  This package of support 
together with access to a qualified experience mentor 
during implementation of the projects ensures that when 
the learner contractors exit the programme they have 
the necessary skills and expertise to tender for and 
execute labour-intensive projects under the Expanded 
Public Works Programme. 
 
 
The Expanded Public Works Programme also requires that 
beneficiaries undergo at least 2 days of training for 
every 22 days worked. The Guidelines for the 
Implementation of Labour-Intensive Infrastructure 
Projects also require that managers of labour-intensive 
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projects be trained in order to build capacity to 
manage Expanded Public Works Programme projects at the 
required scale.   
 
 
According to McCutcheon et al 2006a, there are two 
broad categories of training namely: labour and 
management.  With the 2 days of training for every 22 
days worked, and taking into consideration that 
infrastructure projects last on average for 4 to six 
months, little if any technical training can be 
provided for labourers.  The second type of training is 
that required at all other levels including hands-on 
site supervisors, managers, contractors, consultants 
and clients (McCutcheon et al, 2006a).  Training of 
hands-on site supervisors is also imperative to ensure 
successful implementation of projects as it was found 
by the South African National Productivity Institute 
that management was responsible for 85% of the 
improvement in labour productivity.   
 
 
In summary, aforementioned information suggests that 
the Expanded Public Works Programme has in place most 
of the fundamental requirements to promote successful 
implementation.  Based on lessons learnt and reasons 
for success of large scale programmes from 
international experiences, the Expanded Public Works 
Programme ought to be successful because:    
• the programme is supported and guided by policy 
and has been incorporated into municipal and 
provincial grants;  
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• there is sound intellectual assessment on the 
technical feasibility and economic efficiency of 
labour-intensive methods; 
• concentrated attention was paid to technical, 
institutional, financial, managerial and socio-
economic aspects; 
• extensive and relevant training was and is still 
being conducted;  
• it has medium-term political and financial 
support; and  
• there is good coordination between government, 
government department, those administering the 
programme, local authorities, those providing 
technical assistance and donors.    
 
 
The reviewed literature does not cite the existence of 
a good management and monitoring system which could be 
a threat to the overall achievement of the Expanded 
Public Works Programme.  With no system in place it 
will be difficult to accumulate and capture data on, 
for example, the number of jobs created during 
implementation resulting in under- or overestimation of 
actual employment created.  As a result the results of 
the programme may be open to criticism and questioning, 
which might bring disrepute to this initiative.        
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3.3  Discussion 
 
To summarise, according to McCutcheon (1999), 
evaluations of South African labour-intensive 
programmes have demonstrated that:  
• Projects were rarely found to be labour-intensive;  
• No permanent opportunities were created; 
• No physical and social infrastructural assets were 
created; 
• Projects were not integrated into development 
programmes; 
• Projects were inadequately planned, designed, co-
ordinated and implemented; 
• Institutional capacities were inadequate to deal 
with short-term programmes in addition to normal 
activities; and 
• In some instances, permanent workers were replaced 
by temporary workers.  
 
 
This, in addition to poor targeting of beneficiary 
communities led to an insignificant impact on the 
employment creation effort and most of the programmes 
were considered to be labour-extensive instead.  In 
most cases, the products resulting from the programmes 
were found to be of unacceptable quality and were 
rarely maintained. 
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In order to determine progress on implementation of the 
Expanded Public Works Programme, a workshop19 was 
conducted in September 2004 between representatives of 
the National Department of Public Works (NDPW), members 
of the Portfolio Committee on Public Works and other 
stakeholders where different provinces presented 
progress on the implementation of the programme since 
launch.   
 
 
Major challenges as identified by provinces included:  
• Expanded Public Works Programme conceptual 
framework was not widely understood by decision 
makers; 
• Lack of co-ordination of projects among provinces; 
• Insufficient reporting and inefficient data 
collection, resulting in difficulty in obtaining 
progress reports from provinces; 
• Acceptance of CETA-accredited standards, the low 
numbers of training providers applying for 
accreditation, shortage of accredited training 
providers and lack of understanding of training 
requirements; 
• Lack of personnel, especially in the social sector 
departments allocated to the Expanded Public Works 
Programme, as well as a lack of high-level drive 
to expand the Expanded Public Works Programme 
programmes in this sector; 
                                                 
19 Unknown author (2004) Report of the portfolio committee on 
public works on the workshop held with the Department of Public 
Works, Information sharing with MEC’s, SCOPA public hearing on the 
annual report of the department, the budget committee public 
hearing with the department; Department annual report as adopted 
on 24 November 2004. 
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• Slow consolidation of existing programmes into the 
Expanded Public Works Programme; 
• Corruption, with specific regard to councillors 
who are also building contractors and the possible 
use of public funds for other purposes;   
• Lack of commitment to Expanded Public Works 
Programme targets; 
• Inefficient monitoring systems and the vastness of 
other provinces causing difficulties with regard 
to the supervision and monitoring of projects; 
• Financial constraints for emerging contractors; 
• Lack of sustainable opportunities after qualifying 
as contractors and learners; 
• Inherent conflicts with ongoing conventional 
projects; and 
• Unfair labour practices. 
 
 
The challenges brought up by the municipalities are in 
no way unique, but are reiterative of those encountered 
by previous programmes both in South Africa and other 
sub-Saharan countries.  However, it should be noted 
that these challenges were raised only four months 
after the official launch of the Expanded Public Works 
Programme in May 2004.  The first quarter monitoring 
report in November for the 2004/5 financial year 
indicated that the programme was slowly gathering 
momentum, but that more work was required to obtain 
accurate and comprehensive monitoring reports from all 
the sectors.  The report did not include the number of 
jobs created from infrastructure projects implemented 
by municipalities through Municipal Infrastructure 
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Grant (MIG) because the MIG reporting system was not 
finalised and the Expanded Public Works Programme 
indicators from municipalities could only be reported 
once the system was fully operational.  
 
 
The perceived high cost associated with labour-
intensive construction methods is another serious 
threat to the roll out of the Expanded Public Works 
Programme.  According to McCutcheon et al (2006b), some 
of the amounts already tendered for under the Expanded 
Public Works Programme have been much higher than those 
normally expected from conventional methods.  It was 
found that estimates given by trainees, when asked to 
estimate the cost of a simple labour-intensive 
contract, varied extensively and were two orders of 
magnitude out!  McCutcheon et al (2006b) found that 
many of the tendered prices submitted are of the order 
of 30% more expensive than contracts for similar work 
done by conventional methods.  This suggested that the 
contractors simply price in a 30% increase because they 
are not in a position to evaluate their estimates 
accurately. 
 
 
In order to mitigate this problem, a procedure called 
“team balancing” is recommended.  According to Croswell 
and McCutcheon (2000), the suggested definition of team 
balancing is the optimisation of resources applied to 
any operation, or set of operations comprising a 
project, taking cognisance of parallel and subsequent 
tasks and the need to keep the entire work force 
optimally employed.  A team balancing methodology has 
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been develop and refined.20  Given that the cost of 
labour is a major component of the project cost, lack 
of knowledge of estimating for labour-intensive work is 
a major constraint to sound planning, estimating, 
tendering and implementation (McCutcheon et al, 2006a). 
 
 
3.4  Conclusion 
  
The relative failure of the South African government’s 
previous attempts at labour-intensive programmes post 
1994 can be attributed to many reasons as discussed 
above, but none of the reasons are unique nor are they 
significantly different from those already identified 
in other sub-Saharan countries.  Disturbingly some of 
these experiences date as far back as two decades ago, 
and yet current programmes are still experiencing 
similar challenges.    
 
 
Another disturbing factor encountered in almost all the 
programmes discussed in sub-sections above is the 
limited availability on technical evaluation of the 
programme outcomes.  Evaluations, where conducted, 
focused more on social impacts, the number of jobs 
created, cost, and types of assets produced with very 
little reference made to their quality or maintenance.  
Quality of products resulting from labour-intensive 
initiatives seems to not receive as much attention as 
the other elements of programmes which are typical of 
relief programmes.    
                                                 
20 Croswell and McCutcheon (2003: 387-413) 
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The repetitive and common challenges which are typical 
of labour-intensive programmes may lead to stakeholders 
resorting to business as usual, i.e. equipment 
intensive construction methods, which would deprive the 
country of this potential to significantly increase 
employment generation opportunities.  According to 
McCutcheon et al (2006a), although policy is in place 
and legislation has been enacted, without the teeth of 
enforcement, the opportunity will be avoided by the 
inertia of the status quo.  
 
 
However, despite all these challenges, based on the 
current unemployment and poverty statistics in the 
country, a significant increase in the number of 
persons employed per unit of expenditure has to be 
achieved through the Expanded Public Works Programme 
and the industry as a whole (McCutcheon et al, 2006b).  
One way of achieving this is through the re-engineering 
of the construction industry which is currently 
equipment intensive orientated.  Such re-engineering 
requires regarding significant increase in the 
productive use of labour as a “design driver” in the 
construction process (McCutcheon et al, 2006b).  
Consultants need to be able to estimate works and 
generate appropriate designs and documentation to 
create an environment conducive to the use of labour-
intensive construction methods.  Also, in order for 
work to be executed efficiently, adequately trained 
“hands-on” site supervisors capable of organising and 
managing the use of labour-intensive methods are 
required.  
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Lastly, based on the facts above, it may appear that 
the success of Expanded Public Works Programme is 
already threatened by many serious challenges, the most 
crucial being the suggestion that municipality 
representatives who are supposed to drive the process 
do not understand the concept, requirements and 
implementation plans of the Expanded Public Works 
Programme.  Lack of training provided by the State has 
adversely affected trainers who in turn are not 
equipped with the skills to train municipality 
representatives.  This will severely limit the chances 
of success of the programme as it is at this grass root 
level that projects are to be implemented.   
   
 
This chapter has examined some of the literature 
available on labour-intensive projects and programmes 
conducted in South Africa.  The following two chapters 
will describe and evaluate five water reticulation 
projects conducted labour-intensively in Madibeng 
Municipality.     
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4 MADIBENG MUNICIPALITY WATER PROJECTS  
 
4.1  Introduction  
 
South Africa is demarcated into nine provinces with  
53 district municipalities which in turn have 262 local 
municipalities.  Madibeng Municipality is located in 
the North West Province and is one of the 5 local 
municipalities under Bojanala District Municipality.  
The locality and extent of the Municipality is 
illustrated in Figure 4.1.   
 
 
In 2005, the North West Province was the fourth poorest 
province in South Africa with an official unemployment 
rate of 28.8% (Labour Force Survey, 2005).  The North 
West Province comprises mostly of rural areas.  An 
interpretation of the 2001 and 2005 Statistics South 
Africa data indicates that although the population of 
working age has increased by some 109 000, the number 
of people working has decreased from 918 000 in 2001 to 
875 000 in 2005.    
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  Figure 4.1:  Madibeng Municipality Locality Map  
(Source: Municipal demarcation Board, 2003) 
 
 
In 2001, Madibeng Municipality had a population of 338 
261 and comprised 92 072 households.  The level of 
skills within the jurisdiction of Madibeng Municipality 
was found to be low with the 2001 statistical data 
indicating that only 20% of the population had 
successfully matriculated and only 5% thereof had 
attained tertiary qualifications.  The rest of the 
population had either not completed matric or had no or 
limited primary schooling.  The number of households 
without an income increased from 13% in 1996 to 23% in 
2001, implying that unemployment levels are rising in 
Madibeng.     
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Data from Statistics South Africa (2001) identified at 
least eleven industries which include retail, 
agriculture, manufacturing, mining and construction, 
among other.  These are illustrated in Figure 4.2 
below.      
 
 
Figure 4.2: Madibeng Municipality industries  
(Source: Statistics South Africa 2001) 
 
 
Provincial and Municipality budgets are a controlling 
factor for allocation of funds into different 
industrial sectors.  The largest employing industry was 
manufacturing which employed 18% of the employed 
workforce followed by retail and agriculture which 
employ 14% each.  The mining of platinum and other 
natural resources has resulted in the mining industry 
providing employment for 12% of the employed labour 
force.    
 
 
As discussed in earlier chapters, historically the 
construction industry has proven to be one of the 
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industries which can employ large forces of low skilled 
labour.  However, in Madibeng Municipality the 
construction industry only employed 5% of the total 
employed labour force.   
 
 
Since this research focuses on water supply projects, 
it was important to establish the need for potable 
water infrastructure in the Municipality.  It was found 
that, according to Statistics South Africa (2001), the 
Municipality had 14%, 42.5% and 27.2% of the population 
accessing drinking water from indoors taps system, taps 
inside yard and community stands, respectively.  See 
Figure 4.3 below.  
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Figure 4.3:  Types of water sources in Madibeng Municipality  
(Source: Statistics South Africa, 2001) 
 
 
The population which still relies on stagnant water and 
other unsafe sources of water would form part of the 
justification for the demand which caused the 
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Municipality to embark of the many water project 
conducted over the past five years.   
 
 
This chapter will discuss findings from the evaluation 
of completed projects (namely: Brits Industrial Area, 
Maboloka and Madidi) and one project in Letlhakaneng 
which was underway during the time of research.  In 
general, the projects aimed at providing bulk water 
infrastructure for rural in Madibeng Municipality and 
the works conducted by labour generally included  
activities such as clearing of site, excavation, 
bedding, laying of pipes, backfilling and provision of 
house connection and other supporting structures.  
International and local experience has indicated that 
labour-intensive techniques were possible and suitable 
for the above mentioned tasks, provided the design and 
site conditions allowed for such.   
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4.2  Process for implementation of water 
projects     
 
No formal procedure was documented to guide the process 
of implementation for the water projects.  However, a 
trend was observed in all projects where they generally 
commenced with the Municipality conducting a needs 
analysis to identify and prioritise the needs of local 
communities.  In other words, a demand driven approach 
was used to ensure that the limited available funds 
were utilised appropriately to address community needs.    
 
 
The needs analysis was followed by an application to 
CMIP or MIG21 for funding.  Once funding was approved a 
consultant was appointed who was tasked with the design 
of the infrastructure, preparation of contract 
documentation, tendering, appointment of contractor and 
construction supervision.  Often the approved funding 
from CMIP and MIG were insufficient and had to be 
augmented by funds from other sources such as DWAF, the 
                                                 
21 The Consolidated Municipal Infrastructure Programme (CMIP) was 
the finance vehicle used to provide funds for the infrastructure 
projects applied for and conducted prior to 2004.  The Municipal 
Infrastructure Grant (MIG) provided funding for projects conducted 
subsequent to 2004.  MIG is a conditional grant to support 
municipal capital budgets to fund municipal infrastructure and to 
upgrade existing infrastructure, primarily benefiting poor 
households.  The MIG was set up to merge other funding programmes 
such as CMIP, Water fund Service Capital fund, EPWP, Local 
Economic Development Fund, etc. The MIG is a new infrastructure 
transfer mechanism and is geared to making the system of transfers 
to municipalities simpler, more certain and direct.  Information 
obtained from “The Municipal Infrastructure Grant 2004-2007: From 
programme to projects to sustainable services” by Department of 
Provincial and Local Government. 
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Municipality itself and the People’s Republic of 
China’s Material Grant.   
 
 
A contractor was then appointed following normal 
bidding procedures.  The contractors only provided core 
staff with the rest of the labour to be sourced from 
the local community.  Prior to commencement of 
construction, local Councillors appointed a Project 
Steering Committee (PSC), Community Liaison Officer 
(CLO) and Labour Desk Officer (LDO).    
 
 
After completion of the project, the infrastructure was 
transferred to the Municipality who would then be 
responsible for the running and maintenance thereof, 
ensuring that the infrastructure functions efficiently 
and hence delivers the required services to the 
targeted communities.  Against this background,  
Figure 4.4 illustrates a schematic representation of 
the process followed for the implementation of the 
water projects in the Municipality.   
 
 
One of the major merits of the structure presented in 
Figure 4.4 is the fact that selection of projects to be 
undertaken is guided by thorough needs analysis 
implying that communities are provided with services 
which meet their most pressing needs.  As a result, the 
probability of rejection of the project by the 
community is reduced because they can appreciate the 
impact the project will have on their standards of 
living.   
  
 
67
 
 
  
 
Figure 4.4:  Madibeng Municipality project flow chart 
(Source:  Research fieldwork, 2005) 
 
 
One major disadvantage with the structure is the fact 
that the Project Steering Committee (PSC) is only 
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selected during construction phase and is not involved 
at all during the design phase.  The late involvement 
of the PSC could lead to misunderstanding of the 
importance of project objectives, such as the use of 
labour-intensive methods and payment being linked to 
task completed.     
 
 
The structure also does not show early involvement of 
local councillor who have a significant influence on 
communities.  Exclusion of such important stakeholders 
leads to power struggles which may result in problems 
during construction.  
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4.3  Brits Industrial Area 
 
4.3.1 Introduction 
 
The project is located in Brits and the aim of the 
project was to reduce the frequency of pipe bursts and 
leaks in the industrial area network, increasing the 
reliability of the water supply to the industries and 
increasing pressure in some areas.  The existing 
asbestos pipes could not accommodate the large 
movements resulting from the active clays on which the 
pipes were laid.  As a result, the pipes frequently 
broke and burst leaving the industrial area and 
surrounding communities without water.   
 
 
Labour-intensive construction method was the preferred 
method of construction for the following reasons: 
• The project was funded by the Consolidated 
Municipal Infrastructure Programme (CMIP) which 
provided funds to municipalities for provision of 
infrastructure through the use of emerging 
contractors, the use of labour-intensive 
construction methods and the maximising of job-
creation opportunities. 
• The site conditions were already known because the 
works involved the excavation of existing 
backfilled trenches, hence no hard excavations 
were likely to be encountered. 
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• The site was located in a built up area and 
labour-intensive methods were more suitable 
because of the limited working space required. 
• The risk of damaging other existing services 
traversing the site would be reduced by using 
labour for excavations.     
 
 
4.3.2 Project objectives 
 
The objectives of the project as deduced from various 
project documents obtained from the consultants were: 
1. Use of local sub-contractors where feasible;   
2. Identification of local skills that can be used to 
execute the Works; 
3. Use of labour-intensive construction methods, as 
far as possible; 
4. Business knowledge transfer – a joint venture 
participation between an established contactor and  
Small Micro Medium Enterprises (SMME) with 
Historically Disadvantaged Individual (HDI) 
status; and 
5. Creation of as much employment as possible for the 
local community. 
 
 
4.3.3 Project description  
 
The project was split into different phases because of 
budget constraints and the first phase involved the 
replacement of the prioritised portions of the 
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infrastructure experiencing the most frequent pipe 
bursts as illustrated in Tables 4.1 below.  
 
 
Table 4.1:  Brits Industrial area project description - Phase I  
Pipe no Length (m) 
1   884  
2 1 650 
3   700  
(Source: Bigen Africa Project File, 2003) 
 
 
This phase involved the construction of a total length 
of 3 234m of 250mm diameter pipe.   
 
   
Phase 2 included replacement of the remaining portions 
of the network.  These pipes were as follows: 
 
 
Table 4.2: Brits Industrial area project description - Phase II  
Pipe no Length (m) Diameter (mm) 
4 1 919  160 
5   624  160 
6 1 076  200 
7   490  250 
8   791  160 
9 1 017  160 
(Source: Bigen Africa Project File, 2003) 
 
 
The second phase included the replacement of a total 
pipe length of 5 917m.  Overall, the project involved 
the replacement of a total of 9 151m of existing pipes 
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with uPVC pipes of diameters varying from 160mm to  
250mm.      
 
 
4.3.4 Project information 
 
At the completion of the project, R2.4 million had been 
spent on the project over a period of 9 months.  
Information on youth and disabled persons employed 
during construction was not available.  Table 4.3 
presents a summary of the project information.   
 
 
Table 4.3:  Brits Industrial Area project information  
Project Value  R2 400 000 
Project duration May 2003 – February 2004 
9 months 
Total mandays from local labour  Women Men 
1 210 3 476 
(Source: Bigen Africa Project File, 2003) 
 
 
In total, the project created 4 686 mandays of 
employment for the local community.  
 
 
Labour was used for activities such as the excavation, 
bedding, pipe laying, backfilling of trenches and 
reinstatement of fences and driveways.   
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4.3.5 Project framework analysis  
 
Contract documentation 
 
The contract documentation was amended in a manner 
which accommodated the use of labour-intensive 
construction methods by, for example, classifying 
excavations as follows:   
 
 
PSDB1.2.1 Classes of excavation22 
 
a) Soft excavation 
 
i)  Class 1 
Soft excavation Class 1 shall be excavation, including 
the excavation of boulders not exceeding 0.04m3, in 
material that can be excavated and removed from the 
excavation by an average able bodied labourer or group 
of such labourers, at a rate of production of not less 
than 2.0m3 per 9.25 hour working day, using only picks, 
‘gwalas’, shovels and similar tools. 
 
 
ii) Class 2 
Soft excavation Class 2 shall be excavation, including 
the excavation of boulders not exceeding 0.04m3 
(excluding soft excavation Class 1) in material that 
can be excavated and removed from the excavation by an 
average able bodied labourer or group of such 
labourers, at a rate of production of not less than 
                                                 
22 Clause extract from Bigen Africa, 2003, Brits Industrial area – 
water supply infrastructure rehabilitation/augmentation project; 
Contract S4/2003: Contract Documentation – Project Specifications. 
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1.0m3 and not more than 2.0m3 per 9.25 hour working day 
per labourer, using only picks, ‘gwalas’, shovels and 
similar hand tools.   
 
 
b) Intermediate excavation 
Intermediate excavation shall be excavation (excluding 
soft excavation) in material which requires ripping or 
loosening by mechanical means prior to removal of the 
loosened material utilising methods as described in 
PSDB1.2.2 (a). 
 
 
c) Hard rock excavation 
Hard rock excavations shall be excavation of 
undecomposed boulders exceeding 0,04m3 and excavation 
in solid rock occurring in bulk or in banks or ledges, 
which require loosening or breaking up by drilling, 
wedging, splitting, blasting or by other quarrying 
methods prior to being excavated and removed from the 
excavation using only picks, ‘gwalas’, shovels and 
similar hand tools. 
 
 
Training 
 
No information could be found on the training of the on 
site supervisor; neither was formal training conducted 
for the labourers, but according to the contractor 
interviewed23, labourers learnt technical skills from 
the contractor’s core team.   
                                                 
23 Mr. Chris Jordan from FM Enterprises was interviewed via 
telephone and email on the 21 June 2005. 
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Only the CLO and LDO attended formal training and the 
total cost was R6 720.  
 
 
Contractor development 
  
The contractor appointed for the project comprised a 
joint venture (JV) between an established firm and an 
emerging black firm.  During the interview it was 
established that this project was the first labour-
intensive project to be conducted by the JV partners 
and hence they had limited experience with planning, 
organisation and management of the construction 
process.  According to the contractor, no assistance or 
guidance was provided by the consultants in terms of 
costing or managing the construction process.  It was 
therefore difficult for them to program and cost the 
works.   
 
 
Task determination 
 
The excavation task was determined by employing two 
labourers to conduct trial excavations on the pipe 
route over a day and the average of the productivity 
achieved was taken as the task.  An excavation of 2m3 
was hence established for the specific site conditions.  
The assigned excavation task rate of production of 2m3 
per day is too low when compared to the industry 
average of 3m3 to 6m3 for soft excavation conditions.  
However, the site conditions had guided the decision 
because when dry the clay was very stiff and resisted 
  
 
76
penetration by picks and shovels and when wet the clay 
attached itself to the tools increasing the difficulty 
of excavating.  Excavations had to be conducted at 
optimum moisture content in order to ensure that the 
clay was workable.  Based on these facts, it was 
concluded that the task of 2m3 was reasonable and 
appropriate for the site conditions.  According to 
progress reports, labourers could not achieve more than 
2.2m3/day of excavation.    
 
 
A rate of R55/task, which was equivalent to the 
industry daily average in the province, was paid.  
 
 
Labour issues 
 
The ratio of men to women participating in the project 
was 1:3.  Recruitment was conducted by the LDO and 
there seemed to be no criteria for selection.  No 
targets were set by the Client prior to project 
commencement as to the percentage of women, youth and 
disabled to be employed.   Women and men were paid the 
same rate for tasks and there was no discrimination on 
tasks to be performed based on gender.   
 
 
Payment of progress certificates 
 
The Client was able to process payments on time and 
labourers were hence paid on time and as a result there 
were no delays due to a slow down or strike because of 
late payments.  
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Tools and equipment 
 
Limited equipment plant was used during construction.  
The contractor was required to provide a Troxler 
nuclear system for testing compaction of the backfill.  
For labour-intensive projects, and where local 
contractors are used, the use of basic, readily 
available equipment is encouraged.  For example, a 
Dynamic Cone Penetrometre (DCP) test could be used to 
assess the density of the surrounding natural ground in 
comparison to the trench compactions.  The equipment is 
easy to use, inexpensive, does not require professional 
skills to operate and record readings, and the 
resulting data is easy to analyse and interpret.    
 
 
Taking into account the clayey conditions on soil, the 
Troxler was an appropriate tool to use on this site 
because the consistency or hardness of the clay24 would 
have had an effect on the penetration of the DCP rod 
into the soil.  Under identical conditions throughout 
the site, the DCP could have been used; however, as the 
moisture content of the soil to be tested could not be 
controlled then the DCP tests had a potential of 
providing inaccurate readings.    
 
 
                                                 
24 When dry, the consistency of clay is very hard and it would be 
difficult to penetrate with the DCP rod and the readings would 
indicate very low penetration rates which would imply very hard 
consistency and hence very good compaction.  On the other hand, 
when moist, the consistency of clay would be soft and hence it 
would be easier for the rod to penetrate.  In other words, even if 
compacted to the same density, clay at different moisture contents 
would present different resistance to the penetration of the rod. 
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The survey equipment utilised included an automatic 
surveyor’s level and a tachometer.  Most small 
contractors do not have these instruments or the skills 
to operate them.  As a result, these services would 
have to be outsourced.  An alternative could have been 
the use of aerial photos and fish line and pegging 
system which not only increases the involvement of 
labour, but also has an opportunity to empower local 
sub-contractors with the skills to conduct surveying.  
 
 
Health and Safety 
 
Safety requirements, in accordance with the 
Occupational Health and Safety Act, were not fulfilled 
during construction; however a safety officer was 
appointed to ensure general safety of the site.  There 
were, however, no incidents or accidents recorded 
during construction. 
 
 
Time and productivity 
 
Only 15 days were provided for the contractor to plan 
and organise the site prior to construction 
commencement.  This limited time did not allow for the 
LDO and contractor to determine available local skills 
which could have enhance the skills of the work force.    
 
 
The majority of activities on site were task-based and 
hence only paid for when the work was completed.   
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There was a lack of prior induction of the community; 
as a result there was lack of willingness to work 
especially from people who had not been employed for a 
long time.  A week after construction commencement, the 
labourers complained about the hard work and became 
dissatisfied with wages.   
 
 
According to the contractor, women labourers tended to 
be more committed to the project which was indicated by 
their consistent attendance as presented in the 
project’s attendance sheets.  Supervisors found that 
men tend to be absent for more days than women, 
especially on days subsequent to pay days.   
 
 
4.3.6 Analysis 
 
In order to assess whether labour was used optimally in 
the project, a team balancing exercise was conducted as 
part of the research to determine the number of tasks, 
and hence the cost to labour, which was then compared 
to the actual cost of labour.  This is presented in 
Table 4.4 below.    
 
 
The quantities were calculated from the available 
information such as length of pipeline constructed, 
assumed trench dimensions (based on experience, pipe 
sizes and working space), number of driveways 
reinstated and the Bill of Quantities where available.   
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A total of 9 605 tasks were calculated and at a rate of 
R55/day, the cost to labour would have been  
R 528 259.11.  In reality, 5 475 labour days were 
achieved and with an average of 1.1 tasks achieved per 
day, the actual cost to labour was R331 237.50 which is 
42% of what it could have been had all activities 
designated for labour-intensive construction been 
conducted by labour. 
 
 
Table 4.4:  Team Balancing exercise Brits Industrial Area project 
 
 
Activity Unit a b c d e f 
 
g 
Site 
clearance m2 
      
13,727 100 137 5 27 30 5
Excavate m3 
      
15,374 
     
3  5125 100 51 80 64
Remove pipes m 
      
9,151 
     
90  102 5 20 20 5
Compaction m2 
      
64,057 
     
600  107 4 27 30 4
Re-bedding* m3 
      
6,406 
     
5  1281 30 43 60 21
Pipe laying m 
      
9,151 
     
42  218 4 54 40 5
Blanketing* m3 
      
1,922 
     
6  320 10 32 50 6
Backfilling* m3 
      
7,687 
     
8  961 20 48 70 14
Reinstatement 
of driveways m2 
      
3,000 
     
4  750 20 38 40 19
Reinstatement 
of fences m 
      
730  
     
7  104 5 21 30 3
Site cleaning m2 
      
15,000 
     
30  500 12 42 40 13
Total       9605 215 403 490 159
(Source: Research fieldwork, 2005) 
Key: a- quantity, b- task, c- no of tasks, d- estimated no of 
workers, e- no of days, f- balance days, g- actual no of 
workers.  
* Including wetting to optimum moisture content 
 
 
The project progress reports indicated that in total 
219 labourers were employed for the total duration of 
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the project.  In other words, more labourers were 
appointed although fewer tasks were performed in 
comparison to the 9 605 tasks which were to be 
conducted by 159 labourers according to the team 
balancing exercise.   
 
 
4.3.7 Evaluation of project objectives 
 
The success of a project depends not only on the 
successful length of pipe laid and number of erven 
connected, but also on whether the other non-technical 
objectives were achieved.  The project objectives are 
evaluated below.   
 
 
1.  Use of local sub-contractors 
No involvement of local sub-contractors could be 
deduced from the available information and the 
contractor confirmed that none were utilised during the 
project.  Therefore, the objective was not met. 
 
 
2.  Identification of local skills that can be used to 
execute the Works 
Only unskilled labour from the local communities was 
employed during the project and no analysis of local 
skills was conducted prior to construction because of 
the limited time allocated from appointment of 
contractor to site hand over.  This objective was 
therefore not met.  
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3.  Use of labour-intensive construction methods 
The project documentation explicitly indicated 
activities to be conducted by labour and the payment of 
these were dependent on use of labour.  The project was 
designed to accommodate the use of labour.  The cost to 
labour constituted 14% of the total cost of the project 
which is not significant (as stated under the 
definition of labour-intensive construction projects).   
       
 
4.  Business knowledge transfer  
A 70/30 percentage joint venture (JV) was formed 
between a major contractor and an emerging black 
contractor for the implementation of this project.     
 
 
5.  Creation of as much employment as possible for 
local community. 
Some employment was created during construction, 
however, based on the team balancing exercise more 
employment could have been generated if labour was used 
optimally to conduct all activities which could be 
conducted by labour.  The labour used also appears to 
have not been productive.  Therefore this objective was 
not met.     
 
 
It is therefore concluded that one out of five of the 
objectives were met.   
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4.4  Maboloka and Environs Water Supply Scheme 
 
4.4.1 Introduction 
 
The project entailed the planning, design, construction 
and materials management and implementation of a bulk 
water supply scheme to augment the existing 
infrastructure which supplied Maboloka and surrounding 
rural villages.  The existing bulk water supply 
infrastructure was more than 20 years old and had 
reached the end of its design life.  Rapid growth in 
the villages had resulted in a demand of potable water 
exceeding the capacity of the existing infrastructure.   
 
 
4.4.2 Project objectives 
 
The primary objectives of the project were to:  
1.  Utilise labour-intensive construction methods;  
2.  Include youth and women in an active role during 
construction;  
3.  Conduct pro-active training methods of labourers;  
4.  Implement innovative construction and material 
management approach; and 
5.  Training of emerging contractors. 
 
 
4.4.3 Project description  
 
The entire project consisted of the upgrading of the 
booster pumping station at the Brits, a 20km 600mm 
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diameter pipeline to Maboloka and a 12 Mℓ storage 
capacity at Letlhabile.   
 
 
According to the project implementation plan, 8km of 
the pipeline had to be constructed using labour-
intensive construction methods. 
 
 
The implementation of this project was justifiable 
because it addressed other problems in addition to the 
lack of potable water.  The existing pipe network was 
abused by certain groups in communities who had 
illegally connected to the water supply, drawing water 
without paying for it and then selling it to people 
downstream who could not get water because of 
insufficient capacity.  This theft of water resulted in 
the Municipality being unable to recover its costs and 
also could not meet the demand of all communities.   
 
 
Prior to commencement of the design, an analysis was 
conducted to determine the potential for the 
communities to pay for the water services.  It was 
found that although most of the households did not have 
formal employment, the majority of the houses earned  
R1 100/month.  On this basis, it was concluded that the 
communities would be able to pay for the services 
rendered by the upgraded pipeline.  
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4.4.4 Project information  
 
The project cost was R23.7 million of which  
R11.7 million was for material from the Materials Grant 
from the People’s Republic of China, with the rest of 
the funds obtained from MIG.  The project duration was 
10 months.  Table 4.5 summarises the project 
information. 
 
 
Table 4.5:  Maboloka and Environs – Project Information  
Project Value  R23 700 000
Project duration 
 
October 2004 to August 2005 
10 months 
Total mandays from local labour 
* 
Women Men Youth 
15 318 30 636 30 636 
(Source: Bigen Africa project file, 2004) 
Note: * Figures indicated are not the confirmed actual figures, 
but the target as stipulated during the planning phase of the 
project.  The actual mandays created and the participation of men, 
women and youth could not be confirmed because of lack of data. 
  
 
It was the intention of the project to create a total 
of 76 590 mandays.  The total labour force had to 
comprise 33% of women.  This percentage included all 
women, i.e. both youth and non youth.     
 
 
4.4.5 Project framework analysis 
 
Contractual matters 
 
Limited contract documentation was available on this 
project.  The available information made reference to 
the use of labour-intensive construction methods, 
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although these were only limited to site clearance and 
backfilling of trenches.       
 
 
Training 
 
According to available communication documentation, 
training formed an important part of the Works 
execution and a total of 820 people underwent training, 
with 800 training on practical labour-intensive 
construction, 10 on administration and the rest on life 
skills.  The programme also included the training of 
the LDO and CLO.  Training costs amounted to R300 000 
and was conducted by Construction Education and 
Training Authority (CETA) accredited service providers. 
 
   
The content and modules of the training could not be 
established from the available documentation.  It is 
therefore not possible to determine whether the content 
was relevant and of value to the construction process 
and project as a whole.      
 
 
Contractor development programme  
 
During the project Madibeng Municipality identified, 
appointed and trained ten emerging contractors who 
participated in the delivery of the 8km sections of the 
pipeline.  The Municipality provided constant 
monitoring and assistance for the contractors 
throughout the project and these measures were 
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successful as this panel of pipe laying contractors 
were able to complete their project satisfactorily.   
 
 
At the end of the project, the Municipality provided 
the contractors with further opportunities in pipe 
laying projects which they had to bid for through a 
normal procurement process.  This was an effort to 
ensure that the skills learnt during the Maboloka 
project could be used to further develop and sustain 
these new business entities.  However, these attempts 
failed because of a general lack of entrepreneurship or 
business skills from the contractors.  According to a 
Municipality representative, who wished to remain 
anonymous, most of the contractors were not interested 
in the development and sustainability of their 
business, but they saw this opportunity as a quick 
money making scheme.    
 
 
As a result, subsequent projects awarded to most of the 
contractors were sold to other established contractors 
for a profit25.  As a result, none of the contractors 
succeeded beyond a year of operation.   
  
 
From interviews with representatives from the 
Municipality (who also wished to remain anonymous) 
failure of the contractor initiative programme could be 
                                                 
25 It would appear that the prices on which the contracts were 
awarded were, from the onset, high.  This would partly explain why 
the contracts were sold for a profit and yet the “new” contractors 
were nonetheless able to pay a profit to the emerging contractors 
over and above being able to cover their own costs and still make 
acceptable margins.    
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attributed to the biased selection process of 
appointing participants.  The process was contaminated 
by political fraud and corruption.  The selection was 
not based on the potential or ability of the 
prospective contractor, but decision makers selected 
family members and acquaintances as beneficiaries of 
the programme.   
 
 
Other problems encountered during the Maboloka project 
included power struggles between three active municipal 
councillors representing different wards.  They all 
claimed to be the leaders of the community.  In order 
to resolve the problem, a Project Steering Committee 
(PSC) was elected which fairly represented the 
different groups in the community.  The authority of 
the LDO and CLO were overruled and the PSC assumed the 
responsibility of liaising with the community, 
recruitment and determination of training requirements. 
 
 
The involvement of the main contractor’s permanent 
staff was limited to key personnel with unskilled 
labour sourced from the local community.   
 
 
Task determination  
 
No information on the conditions on site, which would 
direct the decision making for choice of construction 
techniques, was available.  Also no information was 
available on the actual tasks conducted by labour or 
the determination of the task sizes.  The available 
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information also did not distinguish between the 
expenses of the 8km pipe conducted by labour from the 
rest of the pipeline constructed by employing 
conventional construction methods.   
 
   
A rate of R55 was paid per task. 
 
 
Labour issues 
 
A total of 800 labourers were employed on a rotational 
basis26 from the local communities.   
 
 
In order to ensure project buy-in, the consultants 
participated in some of the community’s social events 
and even sponsored a couple of the community’s annual 
events which was a major boost to local participation 
and support for the project. 
  
 
Health and Safety  
 
Health and safety requirement were complied with and 
the services to ensure compliance with the Occupational 
Health and Safety Act (Act 85 of 1993) were outsourced.  
No record of accidents and incidents was found in the 
available information.       
  
 
                                                 
26 The number of labourers working in a team at any one time could 
not be established from the available documentation.  
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Time and productivity  
 
According to the consultants, during construction 
absenteeism was experienced mainly amongst the youth 
and male labourers after pay day which negatively 
affected productivity.  This behaviour was rarely 
observed amongst female labourers whose absenteeism was 
generally due to family responsibilities. 
 
 
4.4.6 Analysis 
 
According to the consultant’s close out report, the 
total project expenditure was as presented in Table 
4.6. 
 
Table 4.6:  Maboloka and Environs Total Project Cost  
Material R11 700 000 
Labour R7 800 000 
Tools/Plant R3 900 000 
Training R300 000 
Total R23 700 000 
(Source: Bigen Africa project file, 2004) 
 
 
Figure 4.5:  Maboloka and Environs total project cost including 
material  
(Source: research fieldwork, 2005) 
Material
50%
Labour 
33% 
Tools/Plant 
16% 
Training
1%
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The material, which was obtained from the materials 
grant, constituted 50% of the total cost while labour 
costs accounted for 33% of the total project cost.  
This amount constituted all monies paid to contractors 
and subcontractors.   
 
 
Problems of theft and wastage of material experienced 
during construction were eliminated by the contractor 
signing for delivery of materials and taking 
responsibility for the storage thereof.        
 
 
According to progress reports and the close out report, 
a total of 76 590 mandays were created during this 
project which is suspiciously the same amount as the 
targeted jobs stated in the project planning 
documentation27.   
 
 
A team balancing exercise was attempted as part of this 
research.  Due to the unavailability of relevant 
project information the activities which, from 
experience, can be conducted labour-intensively were 
used in the team balancing exercise.  The productivity 
norms for determining the size of tasks were obtained 
from Steidl (1998). 
 
 
                                                 
27 It is not often that the actual employment created during 
construction is exactly the same as the targeted employment which 
is conceived prior to the construction process commencing.  No 
labour register was established in the available documentation and 
hence could not confirm the actual number of jobs created.     
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The quantities of tasks were based on a 20km pipeline 
with trenches 1.5m deep and 1.4m wide.  The exercise 
was conducted on the assumption that the entire pipe 
length was constructed using labour-intensive methods 
(in the absence of any guidance as to construction 
methods used on different sections of the pipeline).  
 
 
If all the tasks were conducted using labour, then  
22 677 tasks would have been achieved and at a rate of 
R55/task this would have accounted for only 10% of the 
stated project cost which are considerably low when 
compared to the stated 76 590 mandays and 33% cost to 
labour.   
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Table 4.7:  Team balancing exercise for Maboloka & Environs 
Activity unit a b c d e f g 
Site clearance m2       30,000  100 300 5 60 30 10
Excavate m3       44,800  
     
3  14933 100 149 80 187
Construction of manholes             
    excavation m3         173  
     
3  58 3 19 20 3
    concrete floor casting m2         115  
     
2  58 5 12 10 6
    masonry wall28 m2         288  
     
12  24 2 12 10 2
Compaction m2     140,000 
     
700  200 4 50 30 7
Bedding29 m2       14,000  
     
8  1750 30 58 60 29
Pipe laying m       20,000  
     
42  476 4 119 40 12
Blanketing29 m3        4,200  
     
4  1050 10 105 50 21
Backfilling29 m3       16,800  
     
6  2800 20 140 70 40
Reinstatement of driveways m2        1,300  
     
4  325 20 16 40 8
Reinstatement of fences m        1,424  
     
7  203 5 41 30 7
Site cleaning m2       15,000  
     
30  500 12 42 40 13
Total     22677 220 823 510 344
(Source: Research fieldwork, 2005) 
Key: a- quantity, b- task, c- no of tasks, d- estimated no of workers, e- no of 
days, f- balance days, g- actual no of workers  
  
 
 
                                                 
28 There are 50 bricks in 1m2 of wall.  On average a good brick 
layer can lay 1000 bricks in a day.  Therefore a total of 20m2 can 
be laid in a straight wall in one day.  However, taking into 
consideration the fact that the construction of a manhole requires 
formation of corners and working conditions are constricted, only 
60% of this productivity can reasonably be in one day.  Hence the 
task for construction of masonry walls was assumed to be 12m2.    
 
29 The size of task was derived from using the productivity norm 
for spreading of 13.5m2. Assuming that haulage, compaction and the 
constricted working conditions will take 40% of the total time, a 
task of 8m2 for bedding and backfilling was calculated.  The lower 
task of 6m2 for blanketing was due to the precautionary measures 
required to construct this layer, ensuring that the pipes are not 
damaged.    
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4.4.7 Evaluation of project objectives 
 
1.  Utilising labour-intensive construction methods  
The cost to labour constituted about 33% of the total 
cost of the project.  At first glance, the objective to 
use more labour than conventional construction methods 
appears to have been achieved, but it appears as though 
the labour force was not productive.  Labour-intensive 
construction involves the efficient use of more labour 
than conventional construction methods to produce 
assets of specified quality within the time and cost 
frame, therefore this objective can not be said to have 
been achieved because of the high cost achieved during 
construction.     
 
 
2.  Inclusion of youth and women in an active role 
during construction  
The planned ratio of men to women was 2:1 and the 
project was also supposed to employ a large number of 
youth.  Information on the actual number of women, men, 
youth and disabled employed was not available, hence it 
is impossible to evaluate whether this object was 
actually met. 30     
 
 
                                                 
30 The figures provided in this report for the total mandays 
generated were obtained from the project close out report by Bigen 
Africa.  The report only indicated the total cost for training, 
labour, material and tools and plant without specifically 
indicating the number of women, men, youth employed and trained.  
As a result, the analysis of the project performance can not be 
said to be very accurate because of the limited information 
available.   
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3.  Conduct pro-active training methods of labourers  
Labourers were trained by a service provider who is 
accredited by CETA and some R300 000 was spent on 
training.  The training modules seem to comprise the 
elements necessary to provide the skills for 
supervisors, labourers and other personnel involved in 
the implementation of a labour construction project.    
 
 
4.  Implement innovative construction and material 
management approach 
The consultant's design had taken into account the 
method of construction, and designs were appropriate.  
Labour was not only to be used for the normal site 
clearance, bedding, backfilling, removal and 
reinstatement of fences, but also for construction of 
manholes which were built using masonry walls with a 
concrete base.  These activities increased the 
involvement of labour.  Conventional methods would have 
involved the installation of pre-cast manhole rings 
which would have been too heavy for labourers to 
handle.  The objective of implementing alternative 
construction methods can therefore be said to have been 
met.   
 
 
5.  Emerging contractor development 
The training of labour and the implementation of a 
programme for emerging contractors was successfully 
completed.  Bricklaying skills were added to the 
community’s skill pools which can be used for a wider 
spectrum of projects in the built industry.  In other 
words, the skills learnt were not only confined to pipe 
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laying projects.  These skills may increase the 
opportunity of the labourers to obtain more jobs in 
other sectors such as environmental and social.   
 
 
The ten emerging contractors trained were able to 
achieve the aim of the project which was to construct 
an 8km section of the pipeline.  Due to limited project 
information, an evaluation of the efficiency of these 
contracts could not be conducted.  All ten contractors 
were, however, said to have not been successful beyond 
the project although the Municipality had provided an 
exit strategy by earmarking and reserving certain 
future labour-intensive projects within the 
Municipality for the contractors.  Despite these 
efforts, all the contracting firms failed and any 
subsequent contracts awarded were sold to established 
contractors.   
 
 
The “silent” objective of any contractor development is 
to help start a sustainable business which should 
survive beyond the embryonic phase; otherwise the 
exercise of contractor development is futile.  The fact 
that the emerging contractors failed implies that they 
were left without an income and were drawn back into 
the pool of the unemployed.  It can therefore be said 
that this objective was not met.   
 
 
In conclusion, the project has achieved only two out of 
the five set objectives. 
  
 
97
 
4.5  Oskraal and Environs Water Supply Scheme 
 
The Oskraal and Environs water supply project composed 
of two phases namely the Oskraal Plots and Madidi.  
Madidi was the first project which commenced in 
February 2002.  The overall project was terminated with 
the completion of the Oskraal Plots phase in September 
2003.  The funding of this project was granted by the 
minister of Department of Water Affairs and Forestry 
(DWAF) under the Consolidated Municipal Infrastructure 
Programme (CMIP). 
 
 
The overall aim of the project was to provide water for 
rural communities in and around Madidi.  The designated 
areas were previously served by boreholes with very low 
yields and local people often had to resort to walking 
long distances to get water from polluted water 
sources.  This put the health of the communities at 
risk.  The first phase of the project was evaluated 
separately from the second phases because more 
information was available for the former as it was felt 
that if the two were treated as one, the value of the 
information would be lost.   
 
 
The overall objectives of the Oskraal Environs project 
were to:  
• use local suppliers and sub-contractors; 
• use labour-intensive construction methods where 
possible; and 
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• create as much employment as possible for local 
communities. 
 
 
Information from the two construction phases is 
analysed in the sub-sections below.   
 
 
4.5.1 Madidi Water Reticulation Project 
 
Project description 
 
The Madidi phase included the construction of a 10.6km 
pipeline which would connect to the bulk and internal 
infrastructure components of future phases of the 
Oskraal Environs Project.    
 
 
General Project Information  
 
As indicated in Table 4.8 below, the total project cost 
was R4 773 078 and the projects was conducted over a 
period of nine months. 
 
Table 4.8:  Madidi water reticulation project information  
Project Value  R4 773 078 
Project duration February 2002 to November 2002 
9 months 
Total mandays from local labour  Women Men Youth 
14 214* 17 250* - 
(Source:  Bigen Africa project file, 2002) 
Notes: * Only recorded from February to May 2002 which represents 
only 1/3 of the project duration.  No subsequent information on 
labour was available.  
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No information was available in the available project 
information on the target mandays for women, men and 
youth and the actual mandays, as provided by the site 
diary, are presented in Table 4.8 above.  The 
documenting of labour days was abruptly terminated in 
May 2002 when the project was no longer being conducted 
labour-intensively because of problems encountered 
during construction.  The contractor had experienced 
serious problems with the use of labour and had 
resorted to using conventional construction methods to 
complete the project31.   
 
 
Information from construction phase 
 
Prior to commencement of the actual scope of work, a 
vast section of existing pipeline network was 
discovered and the contractor’s permanent staff had to 
locate the services under a variation order.  The 
possibility of existing services had not been envisaged 
during tendering and the scope of work was increased 
which required an extension of time to complete the 
actual works tendered for.  
 
 
Training - No evidence of formal training was found in 
the project information and the contractor32 confirmed 
                                                 
31 Although an option to change construction methodology was not 
provided for in the contract, the pressure to deliver the project 
on time irrespective of the challenges encountered led to a 
decision by the responsible parties to allow for the use of 
conventional construction methods in order to meet delivery dates.   
32 Telephonic interviews were conducted with a representative from 
the contractor’s firm, Mr. Chris Pelser on 26 October 2005. 
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that the only training offered was by key staff who 
guided and the unskilled local labour force. 
 
 
Tasks - Due to hard excavation conditions, excavations 
were conducted by equipment and labour was used for the 
backfilling and laying of pipes.   
 
 
According to the contractor, the labourers refused to 
be paid per task because of alleged negative influence 
from one of the councillor and some trade union 
representatives.  When approached to intervene, the 
Client and consultants did not offer any support to 
resolve the problem.   
 
 
The contractor therefore paid labourers a daily rate, 
irrespective of productivity.  This resulted in 
labourers only backfilling up to 2m3/day which equated 
to a cost of R25/m3 prior to additional cost of 
watering and compaction.  The contractor had tendered a 
rate of R8/m3 for the 5m3 task.    
 
 
The payment of labourers per hour regardless of 
productivity resulted in a significant increase in the 
project cost.  Claims regarding loss of time and income 
by contractor were rejected by the consultants stating 
that it was the responsibility of the contractor to 
manage, monitor and control productivity of the 
labourers.  As a result, the contractor incurred a loss 
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on the project, but was not willing to disclose the 
financial aspects of the project.   
 
 
Tools and equipment - Excavations were conducted by two 
excavators and three TLB backactors.  Compaction was 
conducted with two VIPAC rollers.   
 
 
Time and productivity - The design had stipulated the 
use of cast iron saddles, but there was a local 
shortage of supply which led to further delays in 
progress on site.  Permission was later granted by the 
consultant to utilise other saddles which were readily 
available in close vicinity of the site.    
 
 
Theft of material and equipment disrupted progress and 
contributed to further delays as it took long to 
replace the stolen equipment.  The site agent was also 
hijacked at gun point.  
 
 
Multiple projects were underway in the same area and at 
the same time as the Madidi project.  During his 
proceedings, another contractor cut off water supply to 
the site.  As a result, the contractor did not have 
water for testing pipes after installation.  A local 
sub-contractor had to be contracted to supply the site 
with some 30 000ℓ/km for the 90mm diameter pipes.   
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Another contractor was conducting blading on roads in 
the vicinity of the site which resulted in most of the 
Madidi contractor’s trenches being backfilled prior to 
installation of the pipes.  As a result more labour, 
time and money was required to re-excavate the 
trenches.   
 
 
All in all, there was a general lack of support from 
the community.  On many occasions, the community from 
certain sections of Madidi prevented the contractor 
from working.     
 
 
An attempt to rotate the labour force in order to 
increase the number of individuals participating in the 
project was not welcomed by the communities.     
 
 
Analysis 
 
No team balancing exercise was established in the 
available project documentation.  A team balancing 
exercise was therefore conducted as part of the 
research and is presented in Table 4.9 below.   
 
 
According to the team balancing exercise presented in 
Table 4.9, the 10 726 tasks would cost R536 309.00 at a 
rate of R50/task.  This would have constituted 11% of 
the total project cost.  On the contrary, the 
contractor confirmed that the actual cost to labour was 
30% of the contract cost which is equivalent to  
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R1 431 923.  When compared to the calculated cost from 
the team balancing exercise, the actual cost was 2.7 
times the calculated cost.  As a result of the 
contractor’s inability to manage the labour force, 
exorbitant cost increases were experienced during the 
project which were incurred by the contractor.    
 
 
In reality, only 2m3 of backfilling was achieved per 
labourer per day which is less than half of the 
estimated task.  The site conditions were conducive for 
more productivity and it can therefore be concluded 
that lack of motivation to produce underpinned the low 
productivity.   
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Table 4.9:  Team balancing exercise for Madidi Water Reticulation  
 
Activity Unit a b c d e f g 
Site clearance m2 
      
15,900  100 159 5 32 30 5
Location of existing 
pipes m3 
      
11,130  3 3710 40 93 70 53
Wetting of soil for 
compaction m2 
      
15,900  90 177 10 18 20 9
Compaction m2 
      
79,500  
    
700 114 4 28 30 4
Bedding m3 
       
7,950  
    
8  994 30 33 60 17
200 diam. pipe laying m 
      
10,600  
    
48  221 4 55 40 6
Blanketing m3 
       
2,385  
    
6  398 10 40 50 8
Backfilling m3 
      
12,720  
    
8  1590 20 80 70 23
Reinstatement of 
driveways m2 
       
3,000  
    
4  750 20 38 40 19
House connections              
     Excavations m3 
       
2,646  
    
3  882 5 176 80 11
     90 mm diam pipe laying  m 
       
3,780  
    
90  42 3 14 20 2
     Bedding and backfilling m3 
       
1,701  
    
5  340 6 57 20 17
     Meter installation no 
       
3,500  
    
13  269 7 38 60 4
Reinstatement of fences m 
       
3,860  
    
7  551 5 110 30 18
Site reinstatement m2 
      
15,900  
    
30  530 12 44 40 13
Total       10726 181 856 660 209
(Source: Research fieldwork, 2005) 
Key: a- quantity, b- task, c- no of tasks, d- estimated no of 
workers, e- no of days, f- balance days, g- actual no of workers  
 
 
The tendered price for backfilling was R8/m3 for 5m3 
task and yet actual volumes achieved were only for 2m3 
at R25/m3 (with a rate of R50/day for an average of 2 
tasks per day).  Figure 4.6 below presents an 
illustration of the comparison of the actual and 
estimated rates.   
  
 
105
 
Figure 4.6:  Comparison of actual vs. tendered tasks and rates for 
Madidi water reticulation project 
(Source: Research fieldwork, 2005) 
 
 
In other words, less than half of the estimated 
backfilling task was achieved at a price which is more 
than three times the tendered price.  Needless to say, 
the contractor was severely affected by the very low 
productivity achieved on site.       
 
 
In conclusion, the project did not have community 
support, which was demonstrated by negative activities 
such as theft of material and equipment, prevention of 
project progress by locals and refusal to be paid per 
task, which is one of the vital fundamentals for the 
successful implementation of labour-intensive 
construction.  
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4.5.2 Oskraal Plots  
 
Project Description 
 
This was the second phase of the Oskraal Environs 
Project and included the upgrading and construction of 
bulk and internal infrastructure components for a 
number of rural villages with some 3 573 families.  
These villages include Oskraal Agricultural Holdings, 
Ramabokala, Rampa, Ramogoadi, Madidi, Lekgema, Rankotia 
and Ntsopilong. 
 
 
The project involved the construction of some 9.4km 
250mm diameter pipe network from Bapong through 
Modderspruit to Majakaneng and a 10 Mℓ reservoir and 
pump station at Majakaneng.  The new pipeline extended 
from the existing Mothutlong reservoir situated in the 
Swartkoppies Mountains, directly north of Mothutlong 
extending to the reservoir between Oskraal and 
Kgabalatsane.   
 
 
DWAF, through the People’s Republic of China Materials 
programme, donated uPVC pipes for the project to an 
estimated value of R9.5 million. 
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General project information  
 
According to the project close out report, the project 
created infrastructure assets worth R11.9 million for 
Madibeng Municipality over a duration of 7 months.  The 
targeted mandays for men, women and youth achieved 
through the project was a total of 31 452 days although 
more mandays were actually achieved as presented in 
Table 4.10 below.      
 
 
Table 4.10:  Oskraal plots project information  
Project Value  R11,9 million 
Project duration February 2003 to August 2003 
7 months 
Actual total mandays from local 
labour  
Women Men Youth 
12 602 20 327 6 813 
Target mandays as per project 
plan 
10 484 10 484 10 484 
(Source: Bigen Africa project file, 2002) 
 
 
Limited information was available with respect to the 
project scope and specifications; hence it was 
impossible to conduct a team balancing exercise for 
this phase of the project.   
 
 
Project Framework 
 
Contractual matters - Madibeng Municipality appointed a 
Community Liaison Officer (CLO) and a Labour Desk 
Officer (LDO) who underwent appropriate training 
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including labour relations, basic leadership and 
management and labour desk organisation.   
Activities such as removal of vegetation, backfilling, 
excavation and removal of existing pipes were some of 
the activities to be conducted labour-intensively.  One 
contractor was appointed for the installation of the 
gravity feeder main and the works had to commence at 
the same time as another contractor who was appointed 
for construction of the reservoirs.   
 
 
The two contracts were being implemented simultaneously 
and it was recommended that the conditions of 
employment for the labourers in the two contracts be 
the same to avoid complaints and dissatisfaction 
amongst workers.  The consultants therefore requested 
that labourers be paid on a fortnightly basis instead 
of a monthly basis in order to be consistent.  However, 
the request was rejected by the contractor on the basis 
that the requests had not been part of the contract 
during bidding and that it was its firm’s policy to pay 
on a monthly basis which still complied with the basic 
conditions of employment. 
   
 
The consultants also requested partial rotation of the 
labour team on a six weekly basis where the core of any 
one team would work for at least one month.  This would 
have ensured a fair distribution of available work to 
individuals in the target communities without 
jeopardising continuity and productivity.  The 
contractor considered partial rotation not to be a good 
practice as it was felt that there would not be 
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sufficient progress and staff would feel insecure, 
which could adversely affect productivity.    
Training - Training provided included management 
training (institutional training), life skills 
training, technical training, project steering 
committee and community member training.  All training 
providers were accredited by CETA.  The Labour Desk 
Officer (LDO) and CLO (Community Liaison Officer) were 
trained in conflict resolution over a period of 3 days, 
while Project Steering Committee (PSC) members were 
trained over a period of 2 months.  
 
 
However, details for the duration and content of the 
training for the labourers or site supervisors could 
not be found in available documentation.     
   
 
Tasks determination - Excavations were conducted by 
machinery because of the shallow rock outcrop 
conditions encountered on site.  Prior to project 
commencement, a TLB backactor was used to excavate 
trial pits to a depth of 1.2m at 250m intervals along 
the pipeline route to determine the excavation 
conditions.  The majority of the site was found to be 
underlain by shallow bedrock therefore excavation by 
labour was deemed to be not feasible33.   
 
 
Due to the shallow rock outcrop soil conditions, 
explosives were used for rip the hard material and then 
                                                 
33 However, they could have used a compressor and jackhammers and 
then proceeded to excavate by hand.   
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equipment was used to remove the ripped material34.  As 
a result, labour was only used for bedding and 
backfilling.  
 
 
Labour - Local unskilled labour was employed during 
project implementation.  According to the project plan 
the same number of mandays for men, women and youth 
were planned.       
 
 
Health and Safety - The services of a safety officer 
were outsourced to ensure that all safety requirements 
were complied with.  The requirements of the 
Occupational Health and Safety Act: No 85 of 1993 were 
complied with.    
 
 
Time and productivity - Progress was adversely affected 
by delays in material delivery.  The client was 
responsible for the delivery of pipes and delay in 
material resulted in labourers not working, hence not 
being paid.  The labourers felt it was unfair to be 
penalised for the late delivery of materials which was 
not within their control.  
 
 
Absenteeism was experienced especially on days 
subsequent to paying labourers which adversely affected 
the construction programme.    
                                                 
34 After “exploding”, the resultant material would be regarded as 
soft and the subsequent excavations could have been conducted 
labour intensively.   
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Social and environmental aspects - Some local residents 
filed complaints that the explosives used during 
trenching had caused severe cracking on their houses.  
No crack survey was conducted prior to the use of 
explosives and an investigation had to be conducted to 
determine whether the cracks had developed as a result 
of blasting.  The investigation, however, concluded 
that the cracks were typical of heave movement in 
clayey areas.      
 
 
Other major problems encountered included the equipment 
traversing and damaging an archaeological site.  
According to archaeologist, the Swartkoppies mountain 
range has hundreds of Iron Age sites associated with 
Early Tswana settlement.  Part of the pipeline 
installation was already underway (some 700m) when it 
was discovered that the excavating activities had 
resulted in the destruction of the archaeological site 
ten meters broad and some seven hundred meters long.  
Cultural resources like archaeological sites are a non-
renewable resource, and the scientific data lost during 
excavation can never be recovered.  Destruction of such 
sites is in contravention of the National Heritage 
Resources Act 1999 (No. 25 of 1999).   
 
 
Nine graves were also traversed during trenching and 
the project was temporarily discontinued.  A rescue 
archaeological survey and excavations were conducted to 
assess damage and determine a way forward at a great 
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expense to the project.  An Environmental Impact 
Assessment had to be conducted to assess the impact on 
the environment and this delayed the project even 
further.  
 
  
Analysis  
 
According to the project close out report, the actual 
total labour days of 39 742 mandays were achieved 
during the project.  Discussions with the consultant 
indicated that on average a person could complete 1.5 
tasks a day35.  This indicates that the set task was 
too low as the labourers could achieve more than one 
task in a day.  No information was found on the actual 
cost to labour; instead the cost was calculated based 
on the task productivities and the number of labour 
days achieved.  At a rate of R50/task, the total cost 
to labour was calculated to be R2 980 650, which is 25% 
of the total cost.   
 
 
The planned number of labour days were compared to the 
actual days achieved this is presented in Figure 4.7.  
It can be deduced from the graph that 17% and 94% more 
women and men, respectively, were employed during the 
project, 35% less than planned youth participation was 
achieved.  An investigation into the low employment of 
youth was not conclusive, but it was the feeling of 
representatives from Madibeng Municipality that there 
was a general lack of interest to participate in the 
                                                 
35 A labourer achieving 1.5 tasks a day implies that they earning 
R75 a day which is well above the minimum wage.  
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project by the youth.  The LDO could not be reached for 
comments or confirmation.  
 
      
 
Figure 4.7:  Oskraal plots actual vs. planned labour days  
(Source: research fieldwork, 2005) 
 
 
It is also considered that in order to extend the 
participation of labour, thereby creating more 
employment for local community, labour could have been 
used to excavate the soil after the hard material was 
ripped and blasted. 
    
 
4.5.3 Evaluation of project objectives 
 
1. Use of local suppliers and sub-contractors 
Records indicated that in the Madidi project, a sub-
contractor was appointed to provide water for the 
testing of pipes.  However, for the Oskraal Plots phase 
the available information does not mention the use of 
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local suppliers and sub-contractors.  Suppliers from 
outside the local communities were used to procure 
materials such as concrete, manhole covers and water 
meters.  There was also no mention of the use of local 
sub-contractors.  This objective was therefore not 
achieved.   
 
 
2. Use of labour-intensive construction methods where 
feasible 
During construction at the Oskraal plots, labour was 
used for activities such as pipe laying and 
backfilling.  I consider that there was more scope to 
increase the use of labour, such as removal of ripped 
material after blasting.  In other words, labour was 
not used as far as possible to increase the expenditure 
per capita on labour.   
 
 
Similarly for the Madidi phase, if the definition of 
labour-intensive construction is adopted as the 
economically efficient employment of as great a 
proportion of labour as is technically feasible to 
produce as high a standard of construction as demanded 
by the specification and allowed by the funding 
available, then this project can not be said to have 
been conducted labour-intensively.  Employment was 
indeed created through the project for many locals, but 
the cost of the project was higher than the budget.  
The project lacked one of the vital principles for 
successful implementation of labour-intensive 
construction methods which is to link payment to 
productivity; hence it resulted in excessive costs.   
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The project was therefore conducted labour extensively 
which means that labour was used regardless of 
productivity.   
 
 
3. Creation of employment for local communities 
The close out report for Oskraal Plots indicates that 
more employment than anticipated was achieved for the 
number of men and women, although it fell short of 
youth participation.  It can therefore be concluded 
that the employment opportunities were created for 
local communities.   
 
 
At Madidi, employment was only created for a third of 
the construction period after which conventional 
construction methods were resorted to because of the 
poor management of the labour which led to the 
construction cost being too high.   
 
 
4.5.4 Conclusion  
 
In conclusion, the Oskraal and Environs Water Supply 
project resulted in infrastructure to the value of 
R27.2 million36 which was handed over to the Madibeng 
Municipality to operate and maintain.  The projects 
analised, i.e. Madidi and Oskraal plots created a total 
of 71 206 mandays with 26 816 mandays to women and 6813 
to youth.  However, the use of labour was not well 
                                                 
36 This cost includes other supporting infrastructure conducted 
under the same programme. 
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planned, organised or managed and as a result was not 
cost effective.       
 
 
A critical evaluation of the overall project objectives 
alludes to the fact that although attempts were made to 
achieve the objectives, the project has fallen short of 
meeting all three objectives.   
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4.6  Letlhakaneng Water Reticulations   
 
4.6.1 Introduction 
 
Fieldwork was conducted on the Letlhakaneng Water 
Reticulations project which was underway at the time 
this research was conducted, but has since been 
completed.  Letlhakaneng water reticulation project is 
the second phase to the Maboloka Environs project.   
The project entailed planning, design, construction, 
materials management and construction of a bulk water 
supply scheme to augment the existing infrastructure 
which supplies Maboloka and surrounding rural villages.   
 
 
The funds for the project were provided by the 
Municipal Infrastructure Grant (MIG). 
 
  
4.6.2 Project objectives 
 
The objectives of the project were:  
• utilisation of labour-intensive construction 
methods;  
• inclusion of women and youth during construction,  
• training of labourers; and 
• utilisation of local sub-contractors. 
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4.6.3 Project description 
 
The project involved an installation of some 12km uPVC 
pipelines, valves, fittings, as well as the 
installation of some 900 domestic water meters. 
   
 
The works included: 
• Site clearance and earthworks required for the 
pipe trenches, 
• Earthworks for, delivery of materials and 
fittings, and laying of approximately 12km of uPVC 
pipeline, varying between 75mm to 200mm  in 
diameter, 
• Construction and installation of approximately 900 
erf connections, including water meters outside 
the stand and standpipe inside the stand. 
• Construction of thrust blocks and/or other 
supports to the pipe work. 
 
 
4.6.4 Project Information 
 
The total project cost was R2 231 474.50 and the 
project was conducted over a duration of 4 months. 
 
Table 4.11:  Letlhakaneng water reticulation project information  
Project Value  R2 231 474.50 
Project duration July 2005 to November 2005 
4 months 
Total mandays from local labour  Women Men Youth 
1594 1990 897 
(Source: Bigen Africa project file, 2005) 
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In total 4481 mandays were created during the project.  
The workforce was rotated every two weeks and the 
participation of men, women and youth was as presented 
in Table 4.11 above.  
 
 
4.6.5 Project Framework 
 
Contract Documentation 
 
According to the contract documentation, certain 
portion of the Works had to be executed using labour-
intensive construction methods.  These excluded 
excavation but included: 
• Clearing and grubbing; 
• Bedding, selected fill, backfilling and compaction 
of all pipe trenches irrespective of depth but 
assisted by mechanical compaction equipment in 
order to achieve the specified densities; 
• Reinstatement of all fill, shoulder and pavement 
layers at road crossings, but using mechanical 
compaction equipment in order to achieve the 
specified densities;  
• Transportation and spoiling of all trench 
materials, where the disposal site is located 
within 20m of source; 
• Removal of oversized materials on the edge of the 
roadway during the construction of roads37; 
                                                 
37 Another contract was awarded to a different contractor to 
construct roads and sewer services in the village.  The scope of 
work for Letlhakaneng water reticulation project appears to have 
been inclusive of some of the activities from the roads and sewer 
contracts.    
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• Laying, testing and disinfection of all pipelines, 
including all fittings, valves, and house/erf 
connections, but excluding all storm water pipe- 
and rectangular culverts; 
• Construction of all manholes, cleaning eyes, kerb 
inlets, junction boxes, culvert floors, end 
structures and balustrades, valve chambers, thrust 
blocks, pipeline markers and the like (earth-, 
concrete-, brick- and metal works), but excluding 
the mixing of concrete and transportation of same 
to the point of pouring; 
• Dismantling and re-erecting of fences; and  
• Cleaning and tidying up of the site. 
 
 
These items were obtained from the Bill of Quantity and 
would only be paid for provided labour-intensive 
construction methods were used.     
 
 
Local sub-contractors were employed to transport 
materials from the stores to the sites, and to provide 
water for compaction of the bedding and backfilling.   
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Photographs 1&2:  Local contractors supplying water and 
delivering pipes to the site 
 
 
There were no written contracts between contractor and 
sub-contractors.  The client was not even aware that 
sub-contractors had been appointed until disputes arose 
because of late payment of sub-contractors.  After 
payment of progress certificates by the Client, the 
main contractor ignored to pay sub-contractors for 
services rendered and a dispute arose when the 
contractor could not pay the sub-contractors.  This 
caused delays on site.  As an intervening measure, a 
memorandum of cession agreement was then entered into 
between the Client and all suppliers and sub-
contractors.  Similarly there were no contracts of 
employment for the labourers.  This practice which is 
not allowed in terms of the Expanded Public Works 
Programme guidelines.   
 
 
Training 
 
No LDO or CLO were trained for this project because the 
community wanted the PSC to be responsible for the 
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running of the project.  Local labourers were not 
trained formally because of their short participating 
duration of only 2 weeks in the project.  Instead the 
contractor’s key staff conducted on-site training for 
new labourers with every rotation.    
 
 
Health and Safety 
 
With the assistance of a health and safety consultant, 
the project was able to meet most of the Health and 
Safety Act requirements.  A health and Safety Manual 
was available on site which detailed hazards and risks 
and also detailed measures to mitigate these risks.  As 
an example, random illegal dumping sites were 
identified as a hazard because it could lead to 
collapse of trenches if encountered during trenching 
and backfilled. 
 
 
Task determination 
 
Although the contract had indicated that excavations 
were to be conducted labour intensively, excavations on 
site were carried out by 3 TLB backactors because of 
the soil conditions on site38.  According to the 
geotechnical report, the site is underlain by strongly 
cemented ferruginised material which classified as a 
medium excavation when using equipment.  The soil 
                                                 
38 Although this project formed part of the Expanded Public Works 
Programme, no contracts were in place as per EPWP guidelines.  Had 
the contracts been in place and the conditions thereof been 
enforced, the contractors would not have been paid because an 
incorrect construction method, which contradicts the terms of the 
contract, would have been used. 
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conditions were therefore not conducive for excavation 
by labour.  However, the deep layer of collapsible soil 
observed on site had a consistency which could be 
classified, in general, as medium dense.  The bottom of 
the trenches were seldom found to be on the hard pan 
ferricrete which would have been hard to excavate, but 
could still be excavated by labour.      
 
 
An average productivity of only 42m of pipe laid per 
day was achieved by a team at any one time, which was 
very low.  This implied that only 7 pipes were laid and 
backfilled per day by the teams.     
 
 
Time and productivity 
 
One of the causes for low productivity was the delay in 
delivery of soil onto site.  This was due to poor 
planning.  Soil for backfilling was obtained from 
borrow pits which were located some  
1km from site and there was no system in place to 
ensure timely delivery of sufficient soil to site.    
 
 
Time was also lost due to idle time due to heat 
stresses.  The average temperature on site was well 
into the thirties on average and the labourers found it 
intolerable to work efficiently under such 
conditions39.   
 
                                                 
39 The teams could have rather opted to work before 9:00  and then 
after 15:00.   
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Social impact  
 
During recruitment a rate of pay was negotiated and 
accepted, but after a week of commencement of Works, 
the community allegedly received negative influence 
from local trade union representatives who encouraged 
them to demand higher wages.  The labourers attempted 
to renegotiate the rates, but the contractor insisted 
that the rate had been agreed upon and was final.  This 
resulted in a strike which delayed the project by some 
three days.  
 
 
The client then negotiated with the labourers an extra 
payment of R5/day for the labourers to utilise their 
own tools, which had to be of acceptable working 
condition.  As a result the labourers were receiving 
R65/task which was higher than the industry average.  
This generated an entrepreneurial flare in the 
community as some individuals bought tools and rented 
them out to the labourers for a rate of R2/day.      
 
 
Generally it was found that women labourers displayed 
more interest in the work than the men40.  They 
expressed a lot of excitement over the opportunity to 
work and moreover, they were intrigued by performing 
work which is traditionally reserved for men.   
 
                                                 
40 Information was obtained from informal interviews (20 September 
2005) conducted on site during which the following people were 
interviewed:  Labourers- Mrs. Ramaboa, Mrs. Montsho, Mr. Dikaneng, 
and the site agent – Mr. Mpho Ntswane.  
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A woman in her 60’s who was part of the workforce 
revealed that she was the sole breadwinner in her 
household and she took care of her deceased daughter’s 
children.  They were barely surviving on her pension 
money and the project had brought some relief hence she 
was committed for the two weeks she had on site.  The 
only downside was that she would have to return home 
after only two weeks, however, the opportunity was 
“better than nothing”.   
 
 
On the other hand, the site agent remarked that the men 
were more easily influenced by negative forces and 
tended to be more dissatisfied than the women. 
Absenteeism was also experienced on workdays succeeding 
paydays. 
 
 
4.6.6 Analysis 
 
By September 2005, 50% of the project time had lapsed 
and only 23% of the works had been completed.  I 
conducted an exercise to identify the cause of the slow 
progress and to find remedial measures to ensure timely 
completion of the project.  
  
   
At the average rate of production of 42m/day of pipe, 
only 3.8km of pipe length would have been laid by the 
end of the 4 months construction period.  The required 
12km would have only been completed by July 2006 (i.e. 
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project duration would have been increased by seven 
months). 
 
 
The 3 TLB backactors were achieving a combined 100m 
pipe length/day, which is lower than expected 
productivity, because of the very dense soil conditions 
and the defective working condition of the equipment.  
However, the slow rate of pipe laying and backfilling 
conducted by labour was identified as the critical 
activity in the project programme.  In order to meet 
the completion deadline, an increase in productivity or 
number of labourers would be required.     
   
 
The resulting strategy to drastically increase 
productivity included the following recommendations:  
- Appointing local donkey cart owners as sub-
contractors to deliver the required backfill 
material from the borrow pit located some 1km away 
from the site.  This would reduce standing time 
due to late delivery of backfilling material.  
- The labourers could be allowed to work from as 
early as possible, when there is sufficient day 
light, so that by the time the summer heat became 
unbearable they would have achieved some 
acceptable productivity for the day.  Drinking 
water could also be provided at accessible 
locations for the workers who currently had to 
walk long distances to get access to potable 
water. 
- The frequent partial rotation of labour reduced 
the rate of production because as the team was 
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achieving its best productive rate, the team was 
replaced by another team which still had to be 
trained.  The benefits of the training were, 
therefore, short-lived and the cycle was then 
repeated with a new team.  Consideration could be 
given to employing a larger force, for example, 
twice the size of the current one (there is 
currently adequate working space to fit more that 
two teams of the current size), and the teams 
could be rotated on a monthly basis instead of  
2 weeks.  
 
 
A team balancing exercise was conducted to determine 
the number of tasks and labour (and hence cost) which 
would be required to complete the work on time.  The 
exercise included the excavation using labour as the 
soil conditions were considered to be conducive for 
such construction methods.  The team balancing exercise 
is presented in Table 4.12 overleaf.   
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Table 4.12:  Team balancing exercise for Letlhakaneng  
 
(Source: Research fieldwork, 2005) 
Key:  a- quantity, b- task, c- no of tasks, d- estimated no of workers, e- no of 
days, f- balance days, g- actual no of workers  
Notes:* Including wetting to optimum moisture content  
 
 
The team balancing exercise indicates that 208 workers 
would be required to undertake the 9 310 tasks.  At a 
rate of R65/task, the cost to labour would have been  
R605 150 which is 27% of total project cost.  More 
over, an additional 4 829 mandays could have been 
created if excavations had been conducted using labour 
and had other available local resources, such as the 
donkey carts, being used.     
                                                 
41 Average Haulage distance to dumping area = 1km.  Therefore, if a 
wheelbarrow has a capacity of 0.065m3 and an average person can 
reasonably make 6 trips in a day (i.e. 12km); therefore the total 
volume which can be removed and hauled per day is 0.39 m3 which is 
rounded off to 0.4 m3.  
 
42 The capacity of a donkey cart is about 0.5m3 (McCutcheon, 
1985)and assuming that one cart can manage 8 trips a day, then the 
total volume which can be hauled in a day is 4m3.    
Activity Unit a b c d e f g 
Site clearance m2 18,000 100 180 5 36 40 5 
Excavation m3 12,000 4 3000 60 50 50 60 
Bedding* m3 7,800 8 975 15 65 60 16 
Pipe laying m 12,000 60 200 6 33 30 7 
Blanketing* m3 2,340 6 390 10 39 40 10 
Backfilling* m3 9,360 8 1170 30 39 40 29 
Reinstatement of road crossings m 1,800 5 360 10 36 35 10 
Removal of oversized material41 m3 80 0.5 160 8 25 15 13 
Construction of manholes No 30 0.5 60 6 10 10 6 
Dismantling and reinstating 
fence m 3,000 15 200 10 20 20 10 
House connections No 900 4 225 10 23 25 9 
Donkey cart Haul42 m3 7,000 4 1750 20 88 60 29 
Site cleaning m2 18,000 30 600 15 40 40 15 
Total      9310 200 467 425 219 
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The resident engineer, however, opted for a different 
strategy to increase productivity by assigning more 
labour to the site.  This resulted in the size of the 
team being tripled and more stringent supervision 
measures being implemented.  In order to save on the 
cost for transportation of the backfilling soil, the 
pedogenic material from the excavations was sieved and 
used for bedding and mixed with the fine grained silty 
sand within the vicinity of the trenches and this was 
used for backfilling.  These interventions improved 
productivity which resulted in an improvement in the 
overall progress of the project. 
 
 
In order to increase the use of labour in the project, 
manholes were constructed in-situ which comprised a 
concrete floor and masonry walls.   
 
 
4.6.7 Evaluation of project objectives  
 
1. Utilisation of local labour-intensive construction 
methods  
Labour-intensive construction methods were used for 
bedding, pipe laying, blanketing and backfilling.  In 
addition, the manholes were constructed in-situ which 
increased the labour content.  A proposal had also been 
made to use potable custom made concrete manhole covers 
in a form of rectangular concrete panels with hooks, 
which could easily be handled and assembled to form the 
manhole cover.   
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The light, easy-to-handle covers would have been 
appropriate for the labourers to handle and hence 
increase the number of activities performed by local 
labour.  Local contractors could also have been used to 
produce the panels creating employment for even more 
locals.  However, the limited duration of the project 
did not allow for setting up of such local producers.   
 
 
The objective of utilising labour-intensive 
construction methods can, however, be said to have been 
achieved. 
 
 
2. Inclusion of women and youth during construction  
The workforce was almost balanced from a gender 
perspective, and youth constituting 20% of the total 
labour force.  Therefore this objective was met. 
    
 
3.  Training 
The contractor, labourers or other project staff did 
not undergo any formal training by a CETA accredited 
trainer.  Instead, the contractor’s core team trained 
the rotating teams in pipe laying and bricklaying 
skills.  Bricklaying skills were invaluable for the 
community as these skills are not only confined to the 
construction industry, but are also beneficial in the 
building industry.   
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Since no formal training was conducted, the labourers 
were not trained on other important aspects such as 
life skills.  The objective to train is therefore 
considered to have not been achieved.          
 
 
4. Utilisation of local sub-contractors 
Local sub-contractors were used to transport material 
and to provide the site with water.  With proper 
planning, it is considered that local sub-contractors 
could have been used to produce manhole covers as 
described above.  In addition, meaningful participation 
of local sub-contractors could have been achieved by 
using donkey carts to transport backfilling soil.  This 
objective was therefore not satisfactorily met because 
local sub-contractors were not optimally used.   
 
 
It is therefore concluded that two out of the four 
project objectives were achieved.  
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4.7  Conclusion 
 
A summary of the evaluation of the projects is 
presented in Table 4.13 below.   
 
 
Table 4.13: Summary of objectives achieved by projects  
Project Name Objectives achieved
Brits Industrial 1 out of 5 
Maboloka 2 out of 5 
Oskraal and Madidi 0 out of 3 
Letlhakaneng 2 out of 4 
(Source: Research fieldwork, 2005) 
 
 
From a technical perspective, all the projects were 
successful as they achieved their aim of providing 
infrastructure assets, but none of the projects were 
able to meet all other principal project objectives.  
The Oskraal Environs project failed to achieve any of 
its objectives.    
 
 
In all projects, some employment opportunities were 
created for unskilled labour forced who were sourced 
from local communities.  The projects provided short-
term income for the locals.  Where training was 
conducted the community was provided with skills which 
will, hopefully, increase their likelihood of finding 
further employment subsequent to project termination. 
 
 
The low rate of achievement of objectives could be 
indicative of the considerable emphasis that is still 
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placed on producing physical infrastructure assets (as 
is the focus for conventional construction methods) and 
sufficient attention is not paid to community and 
social aspects of the project, which are also of great 
importance.   
 
 
In the evaluated projects, unavailability of and poor 
quality of project data was a major limiting factor to 
the research.  It was apparent that there was no 
standardised or formalised reporting system.  The 
Municipality does not appear to have standardised 
requirements for reporting on projects.  As a result 
information available on one project was not 
necessarily available on the next, rendering the 
analysis of the findings very difficult.  Despite these 
challenges, the available information suggests that 
none of the projects achieved all the objectives.   
 
 
Furthermore, no information was available on the 
quality of the produced infrastructure.  The fact that 
the close out reports and media publications confirmed 
that the targeted areas previously without water had 
water at the end of the projects could be taken as an 
unofficial confirmation that the quality of the 
infrastructure was able to deliver adequate water at 
the required pressure to the targeted communities.     
 
 
The following chapter will evaluate the findings and 
analyse observations from the five projects.  
Thereafter, driving and restraining forces will be 
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determined in order to highlight factors which 
supported or prevented successful implementation during 
implementation of projects.        
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5 EVALUATION OF FINDINGS FROM PROJECTS  
  
5.1  Introduction  
 
The previous chapter documented five potable water 
infrastructure projects which were undertaken in 
Madibeng Municipality in the past five years.  Each 
project’s objectives were evaluated to determine the 
overall success of the project taking into account not 
only the technical achievement, but also the social 
aspects which are just as important.   
 
 
Some of the objectives common to all projects included 
training, use of local labour and sub-contractors and 
the creation of employment opportunities for the local 
community.  The projects were funded by Consolidated 
Municipal Infrastructure Programme (CMIP) prior to 
2004/2005 financial year and subsequently by the 
Municipal Infrastructure Grant (MIG).  Only two of the 
projects, namely: Letlhakaneng and Maboloka were funded 
by MIG which implies that the employment created will 
contribute towards the Expanded Public Works 
Programme’s employment creation targets.   
 
 
Although all the projects resulted in the creation of 
much needed infrastructure assets for Madibeng 
Municipality, the projects were found to fall short of 
achieving some of their principal objectives.  At the 
worst, the Oskraal Environs Project was unable to 
satisfactorily meet any of its principal objectives.    
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To some extent, the consultant’s designs and project 
documentation were prepared with the method of 
construction in mind, which was reflected in the 
contract documentation and innovative designs, such as 
the construction of manholes by labour instead of using 
manhole rings.   
 
 
This chapter will analyse the findings from the 
projects evaluated in the previous chapter and the 
driving and restraining forces, as observed in the five 
projects, will be discerned.     
 
 
5.2  Analysis of project information 
 
This sub-section will first analyse the average mandays 
created per kilometre pipe as determined from the 
findings of the five evaluated bulk water 
infrastructure projects.  Secondly, the duration of 
training provided during construction will also be 
evaluated to determine whether sufficient time was 
spent on training on-site supervisors, labourers and 
others involved in the construction process.  
 
 
5.2.1 Percentage of cost to labour   
 
Table 5.1 presents a summary of the actual cost of 
labour compared to the total project cost (including 
the value of material for projects where the materials 
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were obtained from the People’s Republic of China 
Materials programme).   
 
 
Table 5.1:  Summary of cost to labour  
Project name 
Total project 
 Cost  
Actual cost  
to labour 
% to  
Labour 
Brits Industrial R2.4mil R331 237.50 14 
Maboloka R23.7mil R7 800 000.00 33 
Oskraal Environs R16.7mil R4 412 573 28 
Letlhakaneng R2.231mil R646 318.40 27 
(Source: Research fieldwork, 2005) 
 
 
The maximum cost to labour was achieved at the Maboloka 
project at 33% and the lowest was at 14% as achieved at 
the Brits Industrial project.  An average cost to 
labour of 26% was achieved by all projects.  The 
percentage cost to labour should not be viewed in 
isolation, but should be coupled with productivity in 
order to assess whether labour was used efficiently.  
For example, the high cost to labour at Maboloka does 
not necessarily indicate that the high cost to labour 
was expended on productive employment.   
 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the Technical Focus Group 
had found that there were a number of sectors of 
infrastructure in which labour-intensive construction 
methods could be introduced and developed under the 
National Public Works Programme (Phillips et al, 
1995a).  The study found that there was a great 
potential for using labour-intensive methods.  Table 
3.1 presented the spending on targeted labour as a 
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percentage of spending on the total project cost.  The 
Technical Focus Group indicated that labour costs in 
conventional water reticulation construction projects 
constituted between 5% and 15% of the project cost, but 
if the use of labour was optimised the figure could 
increase to between 25% and 35%.  
 
 
As indicated in Table 5.1, and taking into account the 
maximised cost to labour as suggested by the Technical 
Focus Group, only two of the projects in Madibeng 
Municipality managed to achieved labour costs in the 
25% to 35% range, namely Maboloka and Letlhakaneng.  
The Brits and Oskraal projects yielded labour cost 
percentages which were similar to conventional 
construction projects despite them being “labour-
intensive”.  In the case of the Brits Industrial 
project, it could be said that probably labour was not 
used optimally during construction hence the low cost 
to labour.  
 
 
High cost to labour is not necessarily a commendable 
achievement for labour-intensive construction projects.  
If looked at in isolation, high costs could mean 
nothing more than the fact that a great proportion of 
the project funds were spent unproductively on labour.  
This was demonstrated in the Madidi project by 
labourers being paid high rates for very low 
productivities.   
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5.2.2 Resulting employment mandays 
 
The number of mandays created per kilometre pipe is 
presented in Table 5.2.   
 
 
Table 5.2: Mandays per km pipe length 
  
According to Table 5.2, the mandays per kilometre pipe 
length generated by the projects differ with a 
significant variance from as low as 373 to as high as 
4 228 mandays/km.  The large variance could have 
resulted from the fact that some of the projects 
included the construction of additional supporting 
infrastructure, such as reservoirs and pump stations, 
and the available information was such that the cost of 
and employment created by the actual pipe laying could 
not be isolated from the total infrastructure cost.  
The calculation for mandays created per kilometre pipe 
length could have been also been distorted by the 
incomplete information on actual mandays created in 
some of the project. 
 
                                                 
43 Average calculations based on Brits, Maboloka, Madidi and Letlhakaneng projects 
only.  
Project name 
Labour Cost 
(R) 
Pipe 
length(km)
Actual 
Mandays 
Mandays 
per km 
Calc 
mandays* 
Calc 
mandays*/km 
Brits Industrial   491,687.50 9.2 4 686 509 9 605 1 044 
Maboloka 7,800,000.00 20 76 590 3 829.5 22 677 1 133 
Oskraal Plots 2,980,650.00 9.4 39 742 4 228   
Madidi 1,431,923.00 10.6 31 464 2 968 10 726 1 012 
Letlhakaneng   605,150.00 12 4 481 373 8 770 731 
   Average 2 381.5 Average43 980 
*The product of actual no workers and balance days from team balancing 
exercise 
(Source: Research fieldwork, 2005) 
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Data derived from the team balancing exercises was then 
used to estimate the optimum number of employment days 
created per kilometre.  This was done in order to have 
a figure to compare the actual mandays per kilometre 
to.  The resulting mandays per kilometre varied from 
only 731 to 1 133 mandays/km with an average of 980 
mandays/km length.  The variance in the values was 
found to be low and the calculated mandays per 
kilometre pipe was just less than half of the actual 
mandays per kilometre.    
 
 
5.2.3 Training  
 
Information on training of hands-on site supervisors 
and labourers was often not available, but training for 
the Community Liaison Officer (CLO) and the Labour Desk 
Officer (LDO), where provided, is summarised as 
follows: 
 
Brits Industrial Area   : 3 days 
Maboloka      : 4 days 
Oskraal plots    : 3 days 
 
 
On average, the CLO and LDO were trained over a 3 day 
period by accredited service providers.  No training of 
the CLO and LDO was conducted for the Madidi and 
Letlhakaneng projects.   
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Information on the training of unskilled labour was 
only available for the Brits Industrial Area and the 
Maboloka project.  Training was conducted over a period 
of 3 days for a 9 month construction period and a 
period of 4 days for a 10 month construction period for 
Brits Industrial Area and Maboloka projects, 
respectively.  Although based on very limited data, it 
can be concluded that in all cases less than half a day 
of training was provided per 22 days which is 
insufficient when compared to the required two days per 
22 days in terms of Expanded Public Works Programmes 
guidelines.   
 
 
5.3  Driving forces in project implementation  
 
In order to realise the value out of previous 
experiences, it is important to identify factors which 
promoted and encouraged successful implementation 
during construction.  Below are aspects which were 
identified from the evaluated projects as having 
enhanced or acted as driving forces during 
construction. 
 
 
5.3.1 Training 
 
Although not evaluated during this research, literature 
research has proven that training (especially of the 
on-site supervisor) is vital for the successful 
implementation of labour-intensive construction 
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programmes.  The training has to be relevant and 
comprehensible for the local labourers.   
 
 
5.3.2 Health and Safety Compliance  
 
The health and safety aspects of the projects were 
addressed with diligence in all projects, except the 
Brits Industrial Area.  Compliance with the Health and 
Safety Act was ensured by experienced outsourced 
consultants.  Health and Safety issues form an integral 
part of any project and failure to comply with the act 
requirements results in high risk exposure not only for 
the labourers, consultant and contractor, but mostly 
for the client.  Large labour forces are used to 
implement labour-intensive projects which increases 
risk from a health and safety perspective, requiring 
stringent controls to ensure safety for all on site.   
 
 
5.3.3 Prompt payment of progress certificates 
 
The promotion of emerging contractors has been one of 
government’s major focuses for a while.  The correct 
implementation of programmes to assist the development 
of emerging contractors could result in the 
establishment of successful and sustainable 
construction firms.  However, in most cases these 
initiatives fail because of the inability of clients to 
pay progress certificates on time.  Late payment 
introduces cash flow problems and as a result the 
contractor can not pay their creditors, staff and 
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labour force.  This is especially critical in labour-
intensive projects as the late payment of labourers may 
lead to dissatisfaction and unrest which might result 
in strike actions.     
 
 
In the evaluated projects, payment of progress 
certificates was honoured promptly and as a result 
there were no delays in this regard which would have 
adversely affected the construction programme. 
 
 
5.3.4 Proper identification and design of labour-
intensive activities   
 
The implementation of labour-intensive methods begins 
with appropriate designs and is carried through to 
contract documentation which is prepared by 
consultants.  To some extent, the bulk water projects 
evaluated were supported by appropriate designs and 
documentation.  The willingness and capability of a 
consultant to find new avenues of creating productive 
employment within the projects ultimately determines 
the number of jobs to be created.  In the case of the 
evaluated Madibeng Municipality projects, the 
consultants were innovative in finding unconventional 
ways of creating productive employment which 
significantly increased the number of jobs created.        
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5.3.5 Team balancing  
 
Team balancing optimises resources applied to any task 
taking cognizance of parallel and subsequent tasks and 
the need to keep the entire workforce optimally 
employed (Croswell and McCutcheon, 2000).  Team 
balancing also provides other important information 
such as the total number of tasks and the number of 
labourers required which allows a contractor to 
accurately cost and programme the works.   
   
 
It is therefore necessary that consultants learn and 
transfer team balancing skills to the contractors 
participating in labour-intensive projects.  It was 
proven in earlier chapters that the inability to 
estimate cost of projects leads to automatic increase 
in cost tendered for in an attempt to mitigate the risk 
presented by not being able to cost projects.  
 
 
5.3.6 Appropriate planning  
 
Proper planning is the most crucial step towards 
successful implementation of any project.  In order to 
mitigate the problems which were encountered during the 
implementation of the projects evaluated, it was 
important to pay due attention to the following 
planning aspects: 
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• Properly investigating availability of labour and 
determining their willingness to participate in 
labour-intensive projects; 
• Educating and ensuring that labourers comprehend 
the concepts of the method of construction and 
also the objectives of the project; and    
• Establishing proper and reproducible methods of 
determining task sizes which should be negotiated 
and agreed upon prior to commencement of the 
project.     
 
 
5.4 Restraining forces in project 
implementation 
 
Identification of reasons for failure and shortcomings 
in projects could aid the Municipality to avoid 
repeating similar mistakes in projects.  Analysing 
these negative forces can provide invaluable experience 
for future projects and form the basis of best 
practices which, if taken into consideration during the 
planning of future projects may enhance the chances of 
success of projects.     
 
 
5.4.1 Absenteeism 
 
The projects evaluated indicated that problems of 
absenteeism were encountered generally on the workday 
subsequent to payday.  It is common knowledge amongst 
site agents and resident engineers (even those on 
conventional construction sites) that a high rate of 
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absenteeism occurs subsequent to payday.  During the 
Letlhakaneng project, it was observed that this 
behaviour was more prevalent among male labourers than 
females.   
 
 
It is crucial that decision makers be aware of such 
absenteeism patterns so that the effect thereof on 
project programmes is minimised.  An investigation 
could also be conducted to establish measures which can 
discourage such behaviour or reward continuous 
attendance on sites.   
 
 
In addition, research44 indicates that the South 
African construction industry has the third highest 
incidence of HIV/AIDS in the country.  Although not 
researched in this project report, high absenteeism 
should be expected on sites because of the effects of 
HIV and AIDS.  A study needs to be conducted to assess 
the impact of this epidemic on the construction 
industry.  HIV policies have to be developed and 
implemented because the impact of this disease will be 
felt by this industry which is currently repositioning 
itself to be more labour-intensive.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
44 Information obtained from “Specification for HIV/AIDS awareness” (2003) by the 
Construction Industry Development Board, Generic Specification issued for public 
comment, June 2003.  
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5.4.2 Disregarding the involvement of important 
stakeholders  
 
It has been alleged on three of the projects analysed 
that local trade union representatives and local 
councillors visited the site after commencement of 
Works and influenced the labourers to demand more money  
This led to go-slows and strikes, hindering progress. 
The allegations could not be confirmed because the 
people making the allegations did not want to be on 
record expressing negative views about trade unions.  
Trade unions form a critical part of the success of a 
project especially when dealing with labour-intensive 
construction methods.   
 
  
It is therefore recommended that councillors and local 
trade unions be involved at an early stage of the 
project to negotiate rates, task and conditions of 
employment.   
 
 
5.4.3 Low rates of production  
 
The linking of performance to payment is one of the 
pivotal principles of implementing labour-intensive 
construction projects.  Literature has shown that 
failure to pay per task results in extremely low rates 
of production with an exorbitant increase in cost.  
This fact was confirmed by the low productivity 
achieved in the Madidi project where the local 
community refused to be paid per task which resulted in 
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exorbitant increases in the cost to unproductive 
labour.      
 
 
Otherwise, in other projects where payment was linked 
to tasks, the projects achieved acceptable rates of 
production and on average 1.5 tasks45 were achieved per 
day.   
 
 
The late delivery of material to some of the projects 
also contributed to slow productivity.  Late delivery 
implies that the labour force, through no fault of 
theirs, have to be unproductive and idle as they await 
material delivery.   
 
 
5.4.4 Insufficient lead-in times  
 
In all the projects evaluated the contractors were 
given only 15 days from award of tender to site 
handover and commencement of construction.  Prior to 
commencement of the Works a contractor needs to 
familiarise him/herself with the contract documentation 
to ensure that he/she understands the scope of work and 
complies with all contractual requirements, arrange for 
guarantees and insurance.   
 
 
                                                 
45 Although it demonstrates that labourers are motivated to 
increase productivity when payment is linked to tasks completed, 
achieving more than 1 task a day is not necessarily good as it 
indicates that the size of the task might have been set too low.    
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At the same time the contractor also needs to ensure 
that he/she becomes familiar with the site, community 
processes and customs, and engage in some community 
participation activities to achieve project buy-in.    
Fifteen days may have been adequate for conventional 
projects, but with the added responsibilities which 
come with labour-intensive construction methods, the 
time allocation from award of tender to commencement of 
construction needs to be reviewed.   
 
 
5.4.5 Prioritisation of service delivery over 
employment creation 
 
Due to the pressure on municipalities to deliver 
services as soon as possible, it was observed that the 
delivery of services is prioritised over other 
initiatives such as the creation of employment.  This 
is not surprising considering continued violent 
demonstrations against many municipalities, for their 
slow service delivery.  Discussions were conducted with 
representatives46 from Madibeng and Tshwane 
municipalities which revealed that they were not aware 
of any mandatory correlation between the Expanded 
Public Works Programme and the normal delivery process 
of infrastructure assets.     
 
 
When asked whether the Expanded Public Works Programme 
objectives were prioritised during the implementation 
                                                 
46 All municipality representatives requested that their 
identities be kept confidential due to the sensitivity of 
information offered.   Telephone interviews were conducted with 
representatives in November 2005. 
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of infrastructure projects, the most common response 
was that performance was measured only according to 
successful delivery of infrastructure and services and 
not the number of jobs created.  Priority was on a 
faster delivery of infrastructure and little thought 
was given to job creation during projects.   
 
 
As indicated in earlier chapters, the Expanded Public 
Works Programme does not have any special funds 
allocated to it, but relies on the already existing 
grants, such as the Municipal Infrastructure Grant, to 
create jobs while at the same time providing 
infrastructure assets.   
 
 
5.4.6 Absence of contracts for local labourers and 
sub-contractors 
 
During training, Labour Desk Officers (LDO) learnt 
skills to prepare, interpret and issue employment 
contracts.  According to law, every labourer should 
receive an employment contract prior to commencement of 
employment, but in reality this was not always found to 
be the case.   
 
 
Labourers have to sign a contract of employment so that 
they understand the conditions under which they are 
employed.  The contract has to be written in a language 
that is understood by the labourers so that the 
employment conditions are clear.  This would limit the 
number of disputes which may arise from 
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misinterpretation or misunderstanding.  Efforts should 
be made to assist illiterate labourers with their 
contracts so that they can also understand what they 
are signing for.  At Letlhakaneng, some of the 
labourers did not even know what a contract was.     
    
 
The fact that the sub-contractors at Letlhakaneng only 
had a gentleman’s agreement with the main contractor is 
also disturbing.  Proper contract documentation should 
be made compulsory in order to avoid any disputes which 
are likely to arise.  The absence of sub-contracts 
could lead to exploitation of local sub-contractors 
during construction.     
 
 
5.4.7 Poorly defined project objectives  
 
In order to ensure optimum use of local labourers and 
sub-contractors, the Municipality needs to set, monitor 
and enforce specific targets to be achieved by the 
projects and programmes.  It is not adequate to say 
that local labour should be used “as far as practical”, 
for example.  Instead the construction activities to be 
constructed by labour should be explicitly stated and 
compliance thereto should be monitored.  Severe 
penalties, such as no payment for work completed, 
should be implemented if the incorrect method of 
construction is used.  The Guidelines provide the 
contractual basis for achieving these objectives and 
the penalties for non-compliance.        
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In order for the Expanded Public Works Programme to 
reach its target of 1 million work opportunities in the 
set time frame, all municipal projects which are funded 
by MIG and other grants related to the Expanded Public 
Works Programme have to set achievable targets which 
will in turn contribute to the 1 million employment 
opportunities target by 2009. 
 
 
5.4.8 Improper management of emerging contractor 
programmes 
 
Any programmes involving emerging contractor attempted 
by the municipality should be offered to those 
individuals who demonstrate capability and enthusiasm 
to becoming a contractor.  In addition, they should 
have attempted to run their own business prior to the 
programme because candidates’ previous business 
experience could provide an indication of the 
individual’s commitment to running a successful 
business.  Such programmes should not just be seen as a 
quick money making scheme as observed from the 
experience with the 10 contractors trained under the 
Maboloka project, but rather as long-term initiatives 
to assist and support true entrepreneurial ambitions.   
 
 
It is recommended that the selection criteria be 
stringent to limit the entry of individuals who do not 
intend running a sustainable firm, but are looking for 
instant money to upgrade their life styles.  The team 
selecting entrants into the programme should not be 
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biased and should have no relationship with candidates 
to eliminate the problem of nepotism.  This would limit 
the corruption currently plaguing most well meant 
government initiatives and increase the chances of 
success of such business entities beyond the 
learnership programme.  
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6 CONCLUSION  
 
6.1  Introduction  
 
The first chapters in this project report have provided 
a basis for evaluating the five bulk water 
infrastructure projects conducted in Madibeng 
Municipality.  This basis was supported by best 
practices derived from experiences and lessons learnt 
from labour-intensive programmes conducted both 
internationally and in South Africa.  The previous two 
chapters documented, evaluated and analysed the 
findings from the five water projects in Madibeng 
Municipality and one of the major outcomes included 
identifying restraining and driving forces which 
affected the implementation of the project.  
 
 
This chapter draws conclusions on the outcome of the 
research and provides crucial findings from the study.  
It then documents lessons learnt and provides 
recommendations for the planning, organising and 
implementation of future projects and programmes, based 
on the experiences from the projects. 
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6.2  Critical findings from the study 
 
Critical findings from the study can be summarised as 
follows:    
 
• In all projects evaluated, lack of appropriate and 
consistent data was found to be a stumbling block 
to achieving an accurate evaluation of the 
project.  Understandably, at the time of writing 
the Municipal Infrastructure Grants reporting 
system was still not finalised hence the Expanded 
Public Works Programme indicators could only be 
reported once the system was fully operational.  
However, the delay in formalising a reporting 
system will result in information being lost or 
misplaced which will lead to inaccuracies in the 
ultimate reporting of the Expanded Public Works 
Programme on objectives achieved.  This will 
result in a lack of confidence in the overall 
achievement of the programme hence undermining 
this initiative.  
 
 
• Yhe projects within the Municipality appear to be 
run on a project-to-project basis instead of the 
recommended phased approach as recommended by 
McCutcheon et al (2003).  For example, even during 
the implementation of one, the Oskraal project 
which had more than one construction phases, there 
appeared to have been no transfer of information 
or experience from the one phase to the next.  The 
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research has found no continuity between the 
projects despite them being managed under the same 
department in the same Municipality and by the 
same consultants.  
 
 
• During construction disruptions in production 
resulted mainly from:  
- Negative influence on labour by the union 
representatives;  
- Late delivery of material from the client; 
- Too frequent rotation of labour teams; and  
- Absenteeism which was generally experienced 
amongst male labourers.   
 
 
• The analysis of data based on actual and 
hypothetical information indicates that at least  
980 mandays/km can be created if labour-intensive 
construction methods are used productively in bulk 
water infrastructure projects.   
 
 
• In one of the projects evaluated, an emerging 
contractor programme47 was found to be 
unsuccessful because all the trained contracting 
firms were not able to sustain their firms beyond 
the learnership phase.  The reasons for failure 
were suspected to be the flawed and corrupt 
                                                 
47 This emerging contractor programme was an initiative by Madibeng 
Municipality where emerging local contractors were offered an 
opportunity to participate in the Maboloka project and other 
future labour-intensive programmes.  It should not be confused 
with the Expanded Public Works Programme’s learnership programme.     
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selection process where friends and family members 
were selected as participants for the programme.  
This deprived enthusiastic entrepreneurs of an 
opportunity to be trained and gain experience.       
 
 
• The project objectives were found to be too vague 
and there appeared to be no system to monitor or 
enforce achievement.  At times, the objectives 
used such phrases as “as far a possible” instead 
of being specific about the number of jobs 
expected out of a project, which ultimately have 
to contribute towards the greater Expanded Public 
Works Programme targets and objectives.  Most of 
the objectives had to randomly be deduced from 
different project documents and were seldom 
incorporated in the municipal project plans which 
determine what the projects should accomplish.   
 
 
• The importance of the principle of linking payment 
to tasks, which is one of the major reasons for 
success for international and other local labour-
intensive programmes, was demonstrated in the 
Madidi project where the local community refused 
to be paid for tasks completed, but insisted on 
being paid per day.  As a result, production was 
extremely low and the cost to labour increased 
drastically.  The contractor resorted to 
completing the Works with conventional methods and 
made a loss on the project because his estimates 
during tendering did not materialise during 
construction.     
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• Most of the case histories have revealed a lack of 
attention to important detail such as no effort to 
properly determine tasks or acceptable task rates 
which would have enhanced and made the labour 
intensive construction more efficient.  It was 
noted from the case studies that the professional 
team (i.e. Client, consultants and contractors) 
were not thoroughly committed to achieving the 
broader socioeconomic objectives which were 
defined in the preliminary programme 
documentation.     
 
 
• Lastly, it can be concluded that it is possible to 
create significant number of jobs in bulk water 
infrastructure projects without compromising the 
project budget or quality.  This is so, provided 
the projects are planned; organised and managed in 
such a way as to create an environment conducive 
to the implementation of labour-intensive 
construction methods.   
 
 
6.3  Lessons learnt and recommendations  
 
Employment creation and poverty alleviation is one of 
the South African government’s major priorities, and 
the Expanded Public Works Programme is one of the 
strategies to achieve the government’s ambition to 
significantly reduce unemployment and provide skills 
for people.  In view of the fact that they can offer 
skills and create more employment than conventional 
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construction methods while producing infrastructure of 
the specified quality, labour-intensive construction 
methods should be a technology of choice for projects 
and programmes relying on funding from government.  
However, this in no way excludes the invaluable 
contributions that could result from private sector 
projects.     
 
 
In order for this to be achieved, a change of mindset 
and a shift away from traditional perceptions of 
labour-intensive construction is required.  Instead of 
labour-intensive construction methods being limited to 
“special” projects, they should be seen as the primary 
method of implementation with conventional equipment 
based methods being used only as an alternative where 
the environment does not allow for the use of labour-
intensive construction methods. 
 
 
In order to facilitate this transition and encourage 
the use of labour-intensive methods, lessons learnt 
from previous projects and programmes could be used to 
forecast challenges in future projects and assist in 
finding mitigating measures prior to implementation.  
This would facilitate successful execution of projects.  
Based on the findings of the research, a list of 
lessons learnt from the evaluation of water projects in 
Madibeng was compiled and the lessons learnt include:  
 
  
1. A memorandum of cessions agreement facilitates 
the payment of sub-contractors and suppliers 
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which leads to services and products being 
delivered on time, reducing delays on site. 
2. A contract of employment should be signed with 
every worker to ensure that the employment 
conditions are understood and agreed upon 
prior to commencement of work.  Similarly, 
sub-contractors should also have a contract.   
3. Local councillors and trade unions should be 
involved in negotiations from early stages of 
projects.  They could also be involved in the 
determination of tasks and rates and 
negotiations for condition of employment. 
4. Capacity building and buy-in from all 
stakeholders will assist with the success of 
the implementation phase of the project.  
Community participation is vital at all stages 
of a project. 
5. The duration of rotation of teams should be 
such as to allow for skills to be transferred 
and for the use of the acquired skills to 
benefit the project.  If the rotation is too 
frequent, skills are lost with the arrival of 
a new team and the benefits of training do not 
contribute to the project.        
6. Payment has to be linked to tasks in order to 
ensure acceptable productivity.   
7. Sufficient time should be allocated prior to 
construction commencement in order to allow 
time for a thorough analysis of local 
resources which can be utilised during the 
project and hence improve on the participation 
of local communities.   
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8. High rates of absenteeism should be expected 
after payday, especially amongst male 
labourers.  A penalty and reward initiative 
could be implemented to encourage consistency 
in attendance.  
9. Timely delivery of material reduces idling 
time and discouragement of labourers. 
10. The contractor should be paid on time in order 
for the labourers to in turn be paid on time 
to eliminate dissatisfaction, strikes and loss 
of support for the project by the community. 
11. The Municipality should coordinate 
programmes/projects within the same area to 
ensure synergy between project processes.   
12. The Municipality should set specific targets 
to be achieved by a project which are to be in 
line with the Expanded Public Works Programme 
objectives. 
13. Fast delivery of services and infrastructure 
should not be prioritised over other vital 
objectives such as employment creation. 
14. Appropriate and meaningful training is 
required to ensure that skills transfer occurs 
for the benefit of the programme/project, and 
also for the personal development of the 
labourers.  
 
 
It is recommended that the above lessons learnt, 
together with reasons for success/failure from other 
international and local labour-intensive construction 
experiences, be referred to for guidance in execution 
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of future projects in order to avoid repetition of the 
same mistakes.    
 
 
Beyond the achievement of the short-term objectives set 
by a project, the Municipality may have to also 
investigate long-term means of creating employment 
through activities such as maintenance, leak detection, 
efficient meter reading processes and data capturing 
for the installed pipelines.  Such long-term programmes 
will not only create sustainable employment for some 
people in the local communities, but will also improve 
the efficient operation of the Municipality’s water 
network system, hence good quality of services 
delivered.   
 
 
In conclusion, the problems encountered during the five 
projects are not new or unique, but are resonant of 
those encountered in other projects both 
internationally and locally.  At a national level the 
Expanded Public Works Programmes seems to have 
fulfilled most of the basic fundamentals and principles 
of large scale labour-intensive programmes, however, 
serious challenges are being experienced during 
implementation at Municipality level.  At the inception 
of the programme implementation phase it was 
established that some Municipality representatives 
still did not understand the requirements of the 
Expanded Public Works Programme nor the principles and 
objectives of labour-intensive construction methods.  
It is therefore recommended that municipalities conduct 
an audit of the capacity and level of skills within the 
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relevant departments and then invest in establishing 
the required institutional capacity.     
 
 
Similarly, it is also recommended that a proactive 
approach be adopted by training contractors and on-site 
supervisors who are appointed to implement labour-
intensive projects.  It should not be assumed that 
contractors will be able to handle such projects 
without appropriate training and support.   
 
 
Also, it is the design and contract document that 
ultimately determines the method of construction and 
the actual number of jobs to be created during 
programme execution.  It is therefore recommended that 
the selection criteria for appointing consultants 
should include demonstration of capability, innovation 
and commitment to support labour-intensive construction 
initiatives.  This should be in addition to providing 
proof that the consultant has successfully completed a 
course on labour-intensive construction concept and 
principles.  This selection criterion should have a 
substantial weighting in relation to other criteria 
such as cost.    
 
 
Although this research has achieved its objectives, it 
has not dealt with other vital issues such as 
evaluation of quality, operation and maintenance of the 
created infrastructure and the social impact of the 
projects on local communities.  Further research could 
be conducted to determine how the projects affected the 
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communities and how the skills and experience acquired 
during the labour-intensive construction projects have 
affected those who partook in the projects.    
 
 
Lastly, the seemingly higher cost and endless problems 
encountered during labour-intensive projects could lead 
to stakeholders opting to revert to conventional 
construction methods.  However, unemployment, lack of 
skills and poverty remain an undisputable reality in 
South Africa.  Labour-intensive construction methods 
remain one of the avenues in the construction industry 
which has a potential to create employment for the 
large unemployed labour forces with low levels of 
skills.  As a result, reverting to conventional 
construction methods would not only retard substantial 
progress already made towards the use of labour-
intensive construction methods in the country, but 
would also deprive the nation of a practical 
opportunity to alleviate the chronic unemployment 
problem.  Therefore practical solutions need to be 
found within Municipality to mitigate the problems 
which arise from implementation of labour-intensive 
programmes and projects.  Furthermore, these should be 
made “conventional” and become the construction method 
of choice for every project, where feasible.        
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